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Abstract 	  
Since the end of the 1990s, the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) have been increasingly divided over the organization’s long-
cherished code of conduct (known as the ASEAN-Way). For thirty years, a strict 
policy of respect for each other’s sovereignty, non-interference in domestic affairs of 
other member states and decision making by consensus characterized the 
organization. As of late however, a number of member states have been challenging 
and defying these rules, which are widely perceived to be of primary importance for 
the organization’s functioning. This thesis argues that a key determinant in explaining 
the changing ASEAN policies of a number of member states is alteration in, and a 
strong discrepancy between, the stability of the various ruling regimes of the ASEAN 
member states. These alterations in regime stability are strongly related to changes in 
the political legitimacy of a regime. This theory is tested by first examining 
developments in the regime stability of four ASEAN member states: Indonesia, 
Thailand, Malaysia and Vietnam. Subsequently the policies of these states towards 
ASEAN’s pariah member Myanmar are analyzed – functioning as a proxy for state 
behavior with regard to the larger ASEAN-Way issue – in order to assess whether 
expected behavior on the basis of a state’s regime stability aligns with member state 
attempts to alter ASEAN’s status quo. 
 
Keywords: regime stability; political legitimacy; ASEAN-Way; democratization; 
Myanmar     
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1. Introduction 
“Unity in diversity” has long been the device of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), a regional organization consisting of ten Southeast Asian nations.1 
Although from a geographical perspective the formation of ASEAN makes perfect 
sense, the diversity amongst it member states takes such great forms that when taken 
into account, a regional organization comprised of these states becomes less obvious. 
Both demographically and economically the member states are often worlds apart. 
Nonetheless, from Indonesia with its 237 million citizens to tiny Brunei Darussalam 
with a population of only 400.000 and Singapore’s GDP per capita of US$ 60.744 to 
Myanmar’s trifling US$ 1.393, these countries had, for a long time, one thing in 
common: their political systems were all based on authoritarian rule. This meant that 
leaders of the ASEAN member states shared a great concern with regard to regime 
stability.  
The fear for both external and internal threats to their power enabled the 
political elites of the member states to develop a code of conduct that allowed them to 
engage with each other in a constructive and meaningful way, without fear of any 
threats to their regimes. This code of conduct was based on three important rules: a 
strong commitment to the respect for the sovereignty of the member states; non-
intervention in each other’s internal affairs; and consensus among the member states 
as a necessary basis for decision making (Emmerson 2008a). It has become known as 
the “ASEAN-Way” and is widely regarded as the one reason that ASEAN has been 
able to function as an organization that has maintained peace and stability amongst its 
member states. In 1998, Singapore’s Foreign Minister Jayakumar warned that 
abandoning the policy could lead to the break-up of ASEAN: ‘Internal political 
developments’, he argued, ‘will remain a particularly sensitive area with the potential 
to set up centrifugal forces that can pull ASEAN apart’ (Business Times, July 25, 
1998). 
Since the end of the 1990s however, ASEAN’s code of conduct has gotten 
increasingly under pressure. A number of prominent member states have started to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In 1967 ASEAN was established by Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore. In 
1984 Brunei Darussalam joined the organization. During the 1990s ASEAN was expanded with its 
newest four members: Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar.   
2 Although in the past few years the junta has shown cautious signs of improving the domestic political 
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neglect and challenge the rules on which the ASEAN-Way so heavily depends. This 
development coincided with great domestic political turmoil and messy processes of 
democratization in several of the member states, following the 1997-1998 Asian 
financial crisis that severely shook the region. As a consequence, long-ruling dictators 
were toppled and replaced by democratically elected governments. But at the same 
time, other authoritarian governments proved their resilience by defying calls for 
increased democracy, and yet others started moving in the opposite direction, with 
democratically elected rulers increasingly showing authoritarian tendencies.  
The primary way in which the debate around the ASEAN-Way has been 
reflected is in ASEAN’s Myanmar policy – the organization’s most controversial 
member state due to the relentless military junta ruling the country.2 The issue of 
Myanmar has, since the country’s accession into ASEAN in 1997, caused much 
controversy and discussion within the organization about how to approach Myanmar 
and whether or not to interfere in the country’s domestic affairs by pressuring or even 
forcing the ruling generals to change their behavior. The split that the Myanmar issue 
has caused within ASEAN poses an interesting question, for what makes some 
member states willing to disregard the ASEAN-Way, cherished for over three 
decades, while others keep insisting on strict adherence to this code of conduct? 
Moreover, what is the role of democratization in this development?  
This thesis aims to examine the link between the domestic developments in 
the member states that followed the financial crisis, and the changing behavior of a 
number of member states within ASEAN. The thesis does so by developing a theory 
that centers on regime stability as the key variable in determining a state’s regional 
policies. Hence, the research question this thesis aims to answer is: How do changes 
in regime stability affect ASEAN members’ behavior in and towards the 
organization? 
The main argument of this thesis is that the variation in state behavior can be 
explained by changes in the stability of the ruling regimes of the respective member 
states. Advancing a theory centered on governing elites’ security considerations about 
the survival of their own regime, this thesis argues that so-called ‘internal threat 
perceptions’ of a regime are a key determinant in explaining the regional policies of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Although in the past few years the junta has shown cautious signs of improving the domestic political 
system, the situation with regard to civil and political liberties is still far from optimal, the country still 
being rated as ‘not free’ by Freedom House. 
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the ASEAN member states. In relation to this, democratization has a positive 
influence on a regime’s stability, by increasing a regime’s legitimacy and by 
providing previously excluded actors a stake in the political process, reducing 
incentives to subvert or pose violent threats to the regime. 
In order to assess this argument, the thesis examines the regime stability of 
four of ASEAN’s member states – Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and Vietnam – and 
subsequently assesses whether the expected behavior based on the stability of the 
regimes is in line with their actual policies. As to be able to assess these states’ 
preferences on altering or retaining the status quo with regard to the ASEAN-Way, 
their policy regarding Myanmar serves as a proxy. Hence, the second part of the 
analysis applies process tracing to examine the different positions of these four 
ASEAN member states with regard to a number of Myanmar controversies, including 
their run-up and aftermath, during the decade between 1997 and 2007.  
The thesis is outlined as follows. The next chapter provides the reader with a 
review the existing literature on ASEAN and democratization and hybrid regimes in 
Southeast Asia. The subsequent chapters elaborate on the theoretical framework and 
the research design of this thesis. The fourth and the fifth chapter comprise the main 
part of the study. First, an analysis is made of the domestic political systems, and the 
way they have developed, of the four ASEAN member states in order to provide an 
assessment of their regime stability. The chapter is concluded with a section on the 
expected behavior of these states with regard to Myanmar. The next part examines 
whether the expected behavior is in line with the actual behavior of these states 
between 1997 and 2007. The final chapter provides a conclusion. 
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2. Literature Review 
A predominant question in the literature on ASEAN is to what extent, and in which 
way, the organization has been meaningful during its more than four decades of 
existence. It follows that assessments largely dependent on the scholar’s definition of 
“meaningful”. This, in turn, depends on the theoretical perspective through which 
ASEAN is examined.  
 To start with, it is relatively well established that the primary reason for 
ASEAN’s foundation was a shared security concern about domestic and regional 
stability (Leifer 1989; Kivimäki 2012; Emmerson 2008a; Acharya 2000; Wah 2007). 
This is however where the consensus stops. Scholarly assessments on the success of 
ASEAN’s functioning greatly differ in their conclusions. Part of the explanation for 
this is that, depending on their theoretical perspectives, scholars tend to attribute 
importance and meaning to different factors and outcomes.  
 Authors that focus on power, and define this as a regional organization’s 
ability to act, tend to be disillusioned with the organization and portray it as a talking 
shop with little to show for itself. Notwithstanding some minor accomplishments, the 
achieved regional stability should first and foremost be attributed to exogenous 
factors such as balance-of-power dynamics, both within the wider region and globally 
(Emmers 2003). Whereas this conclusion is largely based on the assumption that 
regional stability entails the prevention of inter-state conflicts, other scholars that 
define stability in broader terms go a step further in arguing that ASEAN is a 
meaningless exercise. From this point of view, ASEAN’s inability to resolve 
territorial disputes amongst its member-states, and the organization’s lack of action 
during the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis make the organization little more than a 
rhetoric shell that ‘give[s] form but no substance to domestic and international 
arrangements’ (Jones and Smith 2002).  
 Contrary to this, there is a group of scholars that judges more positively on 
ASEAN’s achievements. These scholars emphasize the value and success of the 
ASEAN-Way (Acharya 2001; Stubbs 2000; Wah 2007). Again, the reason for this 
conclusion can be explained by differing definitions of success. In this sense, ASEAN 
does indeed not function as a conflict-resolution mechanism. It does however, 
	   9	  
function as a valuable conflict-management tool (Jetly 2003). This argument is 
substantiated by the observation that ASEAN members have never fought a single 
conflict with one another since the founding of the organization. Moreover, the value 
of the ASEAN-Way is reflected in the success of ASEAN initiatives in the wider East 
Asia region, where the organization is at the heart of regional platforms of 
engagement such as ASEAN+3 and the East Asia Summit. Within these multilateral 
initiatives, the ASEAN-Way is widely regarded as one of the reasons that regional 
rivals Japan, China and South Korea are able to engage with each other in a 
constructive way (Kuik 2005). 
A number of authors have also addressed the question of whether domestic 
political and economic changes are eroding the ASEAN-Way. It is generally 
acknowledged that these developments have consequences for the organization 
(Kivimäki 2012; Ahmad 2012; Wah 2007). More specifically, it is argued that the old 
ASEAN-Way should be reformed into a ‘set of new framings, norms and identities 
that better fit into the current societal and material realities’. This has to a large extent 
already happened, and the ASEAN-Way has been strengthened instead of weakened 
(Kivimäki 2012). Others are less convinced about the extent to which the organization 
has accomplished to make the necessary reforms, or what these reforms should entail. 
Wah (2007) argues that it is important for ASEAN to channel ‘the current 
pluralisation of new actors who are seeking to lay their hands on foreign policy’ in 
such a direction that it does not stall regional cooperation. Ahmad (2012) argues that 
ASEAN has to further integrate to prevent from ‘sinking into oblivion’. The problem 
with these accounts is that they either have a strong normative, instead of explanatory 
focus, or that they are unconvincing in arguing that norms have changed, without 
assessing the effects these changing norms have on the relationship between the 
democratizing and authoritarian member states within ASEAN.  
Assessments on ASEAN’s relevance differ greatly in their conclusions. This 
can largely be attributed to different expectations and definitions of success. One 
thing that is clear however is that the authors that do judge ASEAN to be a 
meaningful undertaking, base their conclusion on the importance of the organization 
as a conflict-prevention mechanism (Jetly 2003; Kivimäki 2012; Leifer 1989). The 
foundation of this conflict-prevention mechanism is the ASEAN-Way. A second issue 
on which this group of scholars agrees, is that the ASEAN-Way has, in the recent 
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past, become increasingly challenged by a number of important ASEAN member 
states.  
In order to examine the regional policies of the individual ASEAN states it is 
useful to briefly assess a selection of the literature on foreign policy making in states 
that are not full grown liberal democracies nor full-fledged authoritarian: so-called 
hybrid regimes. Hybrid regime theory has in a short period of time become relatively 
well established as a research area. Despite this, it cannot be argued that there exists 
much theoretical consistency in the field. A turning point for hybrid regime research 
has been Thomas Carothers’ call to ‘end the transition paradigm’ (2002). Policy 
makers and aid practitioners had come to see states affected by the ‘third wave’ of 
democracy to be on a clear path of transition, away from dictatorial rule towards 
liberal democracy. This paradigm, perhaps useful in a time of momentous and 
surprising political upheaval, did at the start of the twenty-first century, no longer 
reflect a far more messy reality (Carothers 2002).  
Although one can debate whether policymakers and aid practitioners took 
Carothers’ call to heart, he did find a willing ear amongst academics (Levitsky & Way 
2002; Boogaards 2009). Previously, scholarly research on hybrid regimes largely held 
a view comparable to those of policymakers. Whereas many scholars pointed out the 
importance of hybrid regimes, their analyses were similarly characterized by a 
democratization bias (Case 1996; Zakaria 1997; Means 1997). Mixed regimes were 
often seen as partial or diminished forms of democracy, or indeed, undergoing a 
prolonged transition to democracy. Moreover, terms like semi-authoritarian, illiberal 
democracy and semidemocracy were often used as residual categories and did little to 
take into account important differences amongst hybrid regimes. Consequently, 
scholars have attempted to get rid of this democratization bias by conceptualizing new 
types of hybrid regimes, outlining the mechanisms and character of such regimes in 
much greater detail (Levitsky & Way 2002).  
While important as one of the first attempts to theoretically develop the 
concept of hybrid regimes, such works have given way to complaints by other 
scholars who argue that analysts devote yet more time coining new terms, instead of 
explaining truly relevant issues such as the proliferation of hybrid regimes (McMann 
2006). So far, attempts to approach this issue in a truly systematic way are thinly 
spread. One exception is Boogaards’ embedding of the concepts of defective 
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democracy and electoral authoritarianism in a ‘double-root strategy’ that maps 
contemporary regimes from both sides of the spectrum (2009). 
Approaching hybrid regime scholarship from a theoretical rather than a 
conceptual angle, one can distinguish between two broadly definable theoretical 
perspectives. On one side of the spectrum we find the institutionalist approach (Case 
2009a; Acharya 2003; Levitsky & Way 2002; Dosch 2006; Caballero-Anthony 2009; 
Boogaards 2009). This approach centers on an assessment of the development and 
functioning of state institutions as the key variable in understanding state behavior. 
Where this approach focuses on ASEAN, it the idea of a direct connection between 
democratization and a more open and politically liberal approach in the organization. 
For instance, Caballero-Anthony argues that democratization and participation of 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the policy-making process means ‘the 
closed black box of high policymaking inside ASEAN has finally been cracked open’ 
(2009, pp. 216-127). Hence, with regard to ASEAN, the institutional approach 
focuses on the way changes in structural factors and domestic and external 
institutional mechanisms are expected to lead to ‘participatory regionalism’ (Acharya 
2003).   
On the other side of the spectrum, we find a group of scholars opting for a 
historical sociology approach (Jayasuriya & Rodan 2007; Brown 2007; Hewison 
2007; Jones 2009; Rodan 2012). This school varies from liberal to Marxist 
perspectives on society, but has in common a focus on the way political struggle 
between domestic interest groups shapes a regime. Born out of discontent with the 
institutional approach for not moving beyond consideration of ‘how closely 
institutions mirror or depart from ideal regime types’ (Rodan 2012, p. 313), the 
historical sociology approach argues that regimes should be understood in terms of 
conflict through various modes of political participation. Jones (2009), for instance, 
argues that ‘a focus on the constellation of social forces underpinning regimes, and 
the conflicts over power and interest within them tells us more about state policy than 
the mere presence or absence of democratic institutions’ (p. 388). Consequently it is 
not democratization that leads to a more liberal foreign policy, but the way different 
socio-economic interest groups struggle to ‘shape and delimit formally “democratic” 
institutions and their foreign policy outputs’ (Ibid., p. 402).  
The criticism of the historical sociology school on the institutional approach is 
justified. Democratic transitions are hardly ever straightforward or clean and 
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democratic institutions are often abused, not functioning the way they were designed 
on paper. Hence, assessing the mere existence of democratic institutions can often be 
misleading. The historical sociology approach, nonetheless, poses different problems 
in accounting for the ASEAN policies of the organization’s member states. The most 
fundamental is that this school primarily centers on the way regimes are shaped 
through political representation, but that there’s a lack of focus on the way this shapes 
foreign policy. Where there is a focus on foreign policy, the conclusions are hardly 
generalizable. Assessing the space allowed to liberal legislators in the ASEAN states 
(Jones 2009) is interesting on itself, however, it tells us little about the way foreign 
policy is generated in states where legislators on average exert very little influence on 
this process. 
Strikingly, despite a consensus on the security focused nature of ASEAN, 
neither of these approaches take security factors into account in explaining alterations 
in state behavior within ASEAN. To fill this gap in the literature, this thesis examines 
the issue through a security lens in order to assess what such an approach tell us about 
the changing regional policies of a number of ASEAN member states. 
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3. Theoretical framework 
Taking third world security theory as progressed by such scholars as Ayoob (1995) 
and David (1991) as point of departure, this thesis puts forward a theory of state’s 
altering security perceptions that provides an explanation for their changing ASEAN 
policies. 
The fundamental assumption is that the foreign policy of states is primarily 
shaped by a small group of rational political and business elites. This elite group can 
be seen as a tight network of politicians, big companies, think tanks and influential 
academics. The primary objective of this small elite group is to stay in power. In the 
words of Bueno de Mesquita et al. the desire to survive ‘shapes the selection of 
political institutions and the objectives of foreign policy’ (2003, pp. 8-9). Hence, the 
most powerful determinant of state preferences is the rational calculation of elites of 
what is required to stay in power. The kind of political system through which elites 
govern predetermines the type of calculations they will make. The authoritarian states 
that have long characterized the developing world share a number of characteristics 
that ‘have created a situation in which internal threats (with or without external 
backing) are far more likely to challenge a [developing world] leader’s hold on power 
than are threats from other states’ (David 1991, p. 238). 
 The first characteristic is the importance of the colonial past. The 
independence of former colonies created states where non had existed. Whereas 
Western states developed over centuries, developing states were established more as 
an artificial construct than a coherent unit. This artificiality ‘has created a situation in 
which subnational groups owe allegiance to and act on behalf of interests other than 
the national interest’ (David 1991, p. 239). Second, developing world elites face stark 
problems of legitimacy. The exclusion of a large part of society from the decision-
making process results in dissatisfaction amongst the excluded. Elites often use force 
and violence to establish and retain their position in power and there is a great 
inequality gap between elites and the rest of society. Third, there is a strong 
interrelationship between internal and external threats to the regime. Both domestic 
challengers and elites often seek (and are granted) support from external actors in 
advancing their interests. Internal threats are an important vehicle for outside states, 
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as it determines whose is in power. Because policy is made by a small elite, it is 
attractive for third states to influence the outcome of internal power strives (David 
1991, p. 240).  
 The lack of ability to acquire power through peaceful means results in 
excluded groups turning to violence in order to achieve their goals. Thus, (in)security 
is defined in relation to vulnerability of the ruling elites. These ‘threaten or have the 
potential to bring down or weaken state structures, both territorial and institutional, 
and governing regimes’ (Ayoob 1995, p. 9). What’s more, history has demonstrated 
that the loss of power in authoritarian regimes often goes accompanied by the loss life 
or imprisonment of the ruler and his associates (Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003, pp. 16-
18). It follows that elites in authoritarian developing states conduct a policy that is 
focused on alleviating these threats to their regime. Conceptualizing security as 
threats to regime stability has the benefit of going beyond the narrow focus of 
traditional military security issues and interstate conflict. This way, minority 
movements or environmental destruction can become a security issue when they 
‘acquire political dimensions and threaten state boundaries, state institutions, or 
regime survival’ (Ayoob 1995, p. 9). 
 Third World security theory provides a strong explanation for the policy-
making process in authoritarian developing states. This conclusion can also be drawn 
with regard to regional cooperation amongst authoritarian developing states. Whereas 
liberal democracies’ understanding of regionalism is often based on the European 
Union (EU) model, with its clear pooling of sovereignty and strive for ever closer 
cooperation between the member states, regionalism by authoritarian developing 
states serves the exact opposite end: increasing their hold on power. Or as Kelly puts 
it: ‘weak-state [regional organizations] are mutual sovereignty reinforcement 
coalitions not integrationist regional bodies’ (2007, p. 218). 
 Authoritarian developing states conduct foreign and regional policy focused 
on alleviating domestic security threats to their regime. These internal security threats 
stem from the weak legitimacy inherent to the authoritarian nature of the elite’s claim 
to power. In other words, the foreign policy of a developing state is predominantly 
determined by the stability of its regime. It follows from this that if we want to explain 
shifts in a state’s foreign policy, we have to look for significant alterations in the 
stability of a regime. Significant changes in regime stability come about through the 
transformation of institutional structures of a state. Besides full-grown revolutions, as 
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for instance witnessed during the Arab Spring, another option for this to happen is 
through a (more gradual) process of democratization.  
Democratization affects regime stability through the following causal 
mechanism. First, democratization increases a regime's legitimacy. Whether it is 
through the organization of elections, allowing for increased press freedom, reducing 
corruption and cronyism or strengthening the rule of law, democratization increases a 
regime’s legitimate hold on power and allows governing elites to decrease societal 
support for domestic conflicts by publicly emphasizing these positive developments 
and alleviating incentives to pose threats to the regime. In other words, it reduces the 
chance of subversion and consequently a regime’s obsession with it’s own 
vulnerability.  
Second, it does on the other hand increase the chances of a regime losing 
power through more democratic means. In the words of Dosch: ‘While the conduct of 
foreign policy is mostly free of domestic constraints in authoritarian regimes, in a 
democracy and even in semi-liberal polities, foreign policy choices are linked to the 
interests of other key actors, their perceived effect on the decision-makers’ political 
standing and the views of constituencies’ (2008, p. 530). Consequently, although the 
decision-making process remains dominated by a small elite group, democratization 
offers previously excluded societal actors an indirect stake in this process by reducing 
the rationality for elites to continue fully excluding them. 
In sum, democratization alters a regime’s perception of security threats 
because it increases regime stability. It does so because (1) it reduces subverting 
threats to the regime and (2) it decreases the incentives for elites to fully ignore the 
interests of other societal groups. Here, an important footnote should be made: 
processes of democratization are hardly ever as straightforward in practice as theory 
might suggest. In most cases the democratization process is everything except a 
clearly defined path from autocracy to properly functioning democracy. A 
considerable number of states that embarked on this path have developed into hybrid 
systems: neither autocracy nor full-fledged democracy. Hence, in the case of state’s 
that fail to develop into functioning democracies, we can expect shifts in foreign 
policy only if the changes in the political structures of a state have benefitted the 
stability of a regime. With regard to ASEAN, the following hypotheses can be drawn 
up: 
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H1: The higher a state’s regime stability the more reform minded its ASEAN policies 
are. 
H2: Democratization influences a state’s ASEAN policies through its positive effect 
on the stability of a state’s regime. 
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4. Research design 
Variables and concepts 
Before further outlining the research design, it is important to elaborate on the 
variables and a number of key concepts used in this thesis. To start with, the 
independent variable is a state’s regime stability. A regime is defined as the small 
elite group residing over the state apparatus, allowing them to raise revenue and 
extract resources within a state. It is important to note however, that it concerns 
perceived regime stability here. Foreign policy is not a direct result of the stability of 
a regime, but of the extent to which the elites comprising the regime feel secure of 
their position. The calculation of elites about the stability of their regime is directly 
related to the elite’s internal threat perception: the perceived vulnerability of elites to 
domestic security challenges to their possession of the state apparatus.   
 The dependent variable is a state’s attempts to change the status quo within 
ASEAN. This status quo has been established through a code of conduct that forms the 
fundament of the organization, often referred to as the ASEAN-Way. The ASEAN-
Way is seen as the primary reason the organization has been successful in the realm of 
regional stability and security, but is at the same time perceived to be the biggest 
obstacle for breaking the status quo and hence deeper integration. In sum, the above 
leads to the following sequence: Internal threat perception à Regime stability à 
Foreign policy à Changing/retaining ASEAN’s status quo. 
The intervening variable can be characterized as significant shifts in a state’s 
regime stability. These shifts come about through revolution, through  more gradual 
democratization: a process of political liberalization through which previously 
excluded societal groups increase their influence on the regime’s decision-making 
process, in turn reducing internal security threats to regime stability. 
Case selection 
The method applied to test the hypotheses outlined in the theory section is the conduct 
of elaborate case studies on four ASEAN member-states selected on variation in the 
independent variable. These states are Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and Vietnam. 
Within ASEAN they represent developing middle-income states. With GDP’s per 
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capita of respectively US$ 3563 (Indonesia), US$ 5116 (Thailand), US$ 9941 
(Malaysia) and US$ 1403 (Vietnam) (Chia 2013). Although these differences might 
still seem large, they are not compared to some other possible cases. Singapore, with 
its GDP per capita of US$ 60744 or Cambodia with a mere US$ 879 GDP per capita 
pose these four states strongly in the middle income segment of the ASEAN member 
states. These states are, however, to various degrees expected to differ on the 
independent variable: the stability of the regime. Whereas Indonesia has developed 
into ASEAN’s only functioning democracy, both Thailand and Malaysia are hybrid 
regimes and Vietnam is deemed to be fully authoritarian. 
Needless to say, absolute case similarity is virtually impossible to achieve in 
the real world. Hence, possible differentiations within the similar characteristics of the 
cases will be taken into account during the case studies that follow, and it should be 
possible to draw a number of interesting conclusions about the influence of regime 
stability on the behavior of these states within ASEAN. 
The case studies exist of two parts, first examining the independent variable, 
regime stability of a state, and subsequently assessing the dependent variable, a state’s 
attempts to alter the status quo within ASEAN. The first part consists of a structured 
comparison of the differences between the regimes, whereas the second part applies 
process-tracing in order to examine the respective ASEAN policies. The structure of 
the case studies is outlined in more detail below. 
Observable implications 
Unfortunately but unsurprisingly, directly assessing the threat perception of governing 
elites in these states is not feasible. Records of meetings and policy documents are, 
for understandable reasons, not readily available. Hence, in order to draw conclusions 
about elite threat perceptions, and subsequently regime stability, three factors serving 
as proxies are assessed. The combination of these proxies indicates the extent to 
which elites are concerned with internal threats to their regime. These proxies are (1) 
the degree of disenfranchisement amongst a state’s population; (2) the severity of 
political repression; and (3) the nature of military-civil relationships. Together, these 
factors provide us with a strong indication of the extent to which elites consider their 
regime to be stable. A more elaborate outline of these factors is provided in the 
chapter on internal threat perception and regime stability.  
	   19	  
In order to assess the preferences of the respective states with regard to 
reforming ASEAN, their policies towards Myanmar serve as a proxy. Myanmar 
functions as an excellent proxy for wider ASEAN reform because throughout its 
membership of the organization, Myanmar has confronted the other members with a 
number of situations in which the limitations of the current code of conduct became 
embarrassingly visible. Hence, the way Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and Vietnam 
responded to the troubles caused by Myanmar’s membership of ASEAN tells us a lot 
about the intentions of these states with regard to the ASEAN-Way and the future of 
the organization more generally.  
 The Myanmar policy of these states is examined through process-tracing the 
developments during a decade of ASEAN-Myanmar relationships: from 1997 until 
2007. This period was chosen because it provides a suitable framework for analysis. 
First, during this decade, there was sufficient variation in the domestic political 
situations of the member states under examination and the period contains a number 
of defining moments for ASEAN-Myanmar relations. Second, both 1997 and 2007 
proved to be watershed years for the organization. 1997 was both the year of 
Myanmar’s accession to ASEAN and the start of the Asian Financial Crisis, which 
would turn out to be a region-wide political and economic earthquake. In 2007, 
ASEAN celebrated its 40th anniversary and it adopted its first ever charter, which 
included explicit references to human rights and democratic development.3 
As mentioned, the analysis centers on five defining moments in the ASEAN-
Myanmar relationship: (1) Myanmar’s accession to the organization in 1997 and the 
subsequent international outcry over its admission into ASEAN (2) the 2003 Depayin 
massacre, in which over seventy supporters of Burmese opposition leader Aung San 
Suu Kyi were killed by government organized mobs, where after Suu Kyi herself was 
rearrested (Democratic Voice of Burma 2010). The Depayin massacre caused much 
international dismay and put the other ASEAN member states in a truly awkward 
position for the first time since Myanmar’s controversial accession to the organization 
in 1997; (3) the lead-up to Myanmar’s supposed assumption, and subsequent 
renunciation of the ASEAN Chair in 2005. The debate about whether to grant 
Myanmar’s military junta the chair of the organization put ASEAN in the limelight 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Article 1, paragraph 7 states that one of the purposes of ASEAN is to ‘strengthen democracy, enhance 
good governance and the rule of law, and to promote and protect human rights and fundamental 
freedoms’ (Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, December 2007).   
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and posed a dilemma for the other member sates; and (5) the Saffron Revolution, in 
which the military junta violently cracked down on protesting monks, who demanded 
democratic reforms (The Economist 2007), as well as the lead up to the ASEAN 
Charter. 
Sources 
This thesis draws upon a number of different sources. First, it uses the already 
existing academic literature on ASEAN and the domestic political systems of the 
states comprising the case study. Second, it draws upon articles of a large number of 
established newspapers and press agencies, both Western and regional ones. The 
majority of these articles can be found in the LexisNexis newspaper database. A 
search, ranging from 1997 until 2008, was conducted using three key words: 
“ASEAN, Myanmar and Burma”. This in order to prevent a strong selection bias of 
either outspoken opponents or defenders of the military junta. Third, this thesis uses 
official documents of both ASEAN and the national governments of its member 
states. It should be stressed however, that no direct conclusions are derived from these 
documents, and that they are primarily used to substantiate conclusions drawn from 
more neutral sources. Fourth, this thesis draws upon reports from both regional and 
international NGOs, such as Human Rights Watch, the International Crisis Group and 
Freedom House. 
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5. Internal threat perception and regime stability 
This chapter assesses the internal threat perception and regime stability of the four 
states that form this case study. It starts by elaborating on the three different factors 
used to examine these issues and continues with providing separate analyses of the 
four states. The chapter ends with a conclusion summarizing the findings and, on the 
basis thereof, outlining the expectations with regard to the states’ Myanmar policies. 
 All three indicators are derivatives of a core concept within the analysis of 
political power: political legitimacy. In the words of Beetham: ‘Since the dawn of 
human history, those occupying positions of power, and especially political power, 
have sought to ground their authority in a principle of legitimacy, which shows why 
their access to, and exercise of, power is rightful, and why those subject to it have a 
corresponding duty to obey’ (2001, p. 107). Hence, it can be argued that political 
legitimacy lies at the core of any regime’s stability, as a lack of legitimacy is the 
primary motive for internal challenges to the regime. If one’s right to exercise power 
is acknowledged by the ones that need to obey it, there exist no rational reasons for 
other actors to challenge this right in an unlawful way. Beetham provides us with a 
very useful typology of legitimacy. Political authority, he argues, is legitimate to the 
extent that: 
 
1. It is acquired and exercised according to established rules (legality); 
2. The rules are justifiable according to socially accepted beliefs about (i) the 
rightful source of authority, and (ii) the proper ends and standards of 
government (normative justifiability); 
3. Positions of authority are confirmed by express consent or affirmation of 
appropriate subordinates, and by recognition from other legitimate 
authorities (legitimation) (2001, p. 110). 
 
Beetham adds that ‘the three levels are not alternatives, since all contribute to 
legitimacy; together they provide the subordinate with moral grounds for compliance 
or cooperation with authority’ (Ibid.). Because political legitimacy is so strongly 
related to the origination of internal threats and regime stability, the indicators 
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outlined below are derived from the concepts of legality, normative justifiability and 
legitimation.  
To start with, the degree of disenfranchisement amongst a state’s population 
indicates to what extent a population (or parts of it) has a stake in the political system. 
It is likely that an individual or a group of individuals is unwilling to accept a regime 
as the rightful source of authority as long as they are systematically denied a stake in 
its affairs. Here the following question should be asked: is there a voting system and 
if so, how fair and inclusive are the elections? It is well established that one important 
source of legitimacy stems from the idea that a regime represents “the people”. This is 
perhaps best reflected by the fact that even the most totalitarian states often refer to 
themselves as so called “People’s Republics”; the clearest example probably being the 
Democratic Peoples Republic of North Korea. Thus, being denied influence on who 
comprises a government increases the likelihood that individuals or groups of 
individuals refuse to recognize its lawfulness. Second, the emphasis should be on the 
possible exclusion of certain groups. Whereas individuals might feel excluded, they 
are less likely to pose a threat to regime stability than groups. These groups can be 
based on ethnicity, religion, and class but are often a combination. A third, related, 
question concerns the extent to which power is centralized. A strong centralization of 
power indicates a lack of checks and balances, and hence accountability, within the 
political system. Moreover, ‘decentralization is also regarded as a way of diffusing 
social and political tensions and ensuring local cultural and political autonomy 
(Bardhan 2002, p. 185).  
Second, the severity of political repression indicates to what extent a regime 
allows criticism towards its policies to be voiced. A government’s response towards 
critics and protests relate to whether they exercise their power according to 
established rules and to whether these rules are justifiable according to socially 
accepted beliefs about the proper ends and standards of governments. Few will agree 
that the violent repression of political opponents or merely individuals or groups that 
disagree with a government’s policies belongs to these proper ends and standards of 
government. Moreover, the harshness of a regime’s repression indicates how 
threatened it feels in its existence, for there is no rational reason to defend yourself 
from something that is not perceived to be a threat. Hence, the following questions are 
asked: what space is there for individuals and groups to publicly voice their 
disagreement with a regime’s decisions? And, depending on the limits of this 
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protesting space: how harsh are a regime’s crackdowns on protesters and political 
opponents? 
Third is the nature of the relationship between the regime and the military, 
which relates to the confirmation of authority by affirmation of appropriate 
subordinates. Perhaps the sole reason a government is able to exercise authority is 
through its monopoly on the use of force (Weber 1947). The military has since the 
early days of modern society functioned as the primary tool through which this 
monopoly on the use of force is exercised and is thus an essential factor in the 
functioning of a regime. Consequently, when a regime is unable (or no longer able) to 
secure strong support of the military, or when the military refuses to any longer 
subordinate itself to the authority of the ruling-elites, it has grave consequences for a 
regime’s stability. Although Southeast Asia in general has a long history of coup 
politics, some states have proven more prone to coups than others (Mietzner & 
Farrelly 2013). This is primarily due to historically shaped underlying structures of 
civil-military relations (Beeson 2008). Therefore the following question is examined: 
what is the underlying nature of the relationship between the military and the 
governing regime? 
Indonesia 
The year in which Indonesia embarked on a path of significant changes to its political 
system was 1998, when student-led urban protests caused the toppling of long-term 
president Suharto. His New Order government had been in charge for the past three 
decades, but Suharto failed to provide a satisfying answer to public discontent about 
Indonesia’s economic state, which had been badly affected by the Asian financial 
crisis of 1997/98 (Heiduk 2011, p. 255). After Suharto’s fall, the leadership of the 
Reformasi movement, which had originated with students, was transferred into the 
hands of the Indonesian elites, who agreed on the implementation of a large number 
of institutional reforms, transforming Indonesia into ‘Southeast Asia’s strongest and 
most stable democracy’ (Mietzner 2013, p. 216). 
 
Disenfranchisement 
After Suharto’s fall, Indonesia developed an electoral system which is relatively free 
and fair. In 1999 parliamentary elections were held, while the president was still 
picked through elite consensus. Although this President, Habibe, was in 2001 
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impeached by Indonesia’s parliament, this move did not lead to a new democratic 
crisis. This was followed by elections in 2004, in which the president was directly 
elected for the first time. Contrary to the three political parties allowed by Suharto, a 
large number of new parties was allowed to participate in the elections, leading to 48 
contenders. Furthermore, although there were reports of small scale attempts to bribe 
voters and the usage of illegal funds for campaigning, these seem to have been minor 
incidents in a largely free and fair process (Freedom House 2001). Importantly, 
although the 1999 elections were far from flawless, they were judged both 
domestically and internationally to have been acceptable and to have reflected the will 
of the people (Ellis 2000). These democratic reforms have persisted and were 
expanded in 2004, when after civil-society pressure, it was decided that the 
presidency from now on would also be subject of direct elections, instead of being 
picked by both houses of parliament (Slater 2006). Hence, it can be concluded that 
Indonesia has developed a meaningful electoral system which has been consolidated 
and expanded throughout the decade after its origination. In the words of Carnegie: 
‘two consecutive free and fair elections and a transfer from incumbent opposition 
means that Indonesia has passed a key litmus test of democratic consolidation’ (2008, 
p. 523). 
 Nonetheless, it is important to note that although Indonesia’s institutions 
underwent a profound transformation, underlying power structures remained largely 
unchanged. That is, the elites comprising Suharto’s New Order have proven to adapt 
well to the new democratic rules. According to Slater, ‘Indonesia’s pre-eminent 
political figures have remained practically irremovable trough the electoral process, 
even though elections themselves have been commendably free and fair’ (2006, p. 
208). The primary cause for this is the persistence of money politics and the high 
costs of running for office, which have made it increasingly difficult for new comers 
to successfully enter the electoral contest (Hillman 2006). It should be emphasized 
however, that this development has primarily manifested itself at the regional and 
local level. This leads to a third important factor in Indonesia’s institutional 
transformation: a policy of strong decentralization of power. 
 Introduced in 1999 by Suharto’s successor, Habibie, the decentralization 
policy forms one of the most profound alterations in Indonesia’s political system. 
Decentralization comprised a devaluation of government authority accompanied by 
the establishment of new fiscal and revenue-raising powers. The policy has made 
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provinces, regencies and cities into important political and fiscal actors in the newly 
devolved structure. Decentralization has not met all expectations initially voiced by 
‘good governance’ proponents. Instead of the expected local community 
empowerment, it has instead provided a ‘lifeline to New Order-nurtured local elites’, 
allowing them to reinvent themselves in accordance with the new democratic system 
(Hadiz 2007). Nonetheless, even though the decentralization process has not fully 
answered to the expectations, it has to a large extent decreased the power of the 
central authority and consequently the checks and balances build into the political 
system. 
 Democratization and decentralization have also profoundly influenced 
Indonesia’s separatist and communal conflicts. During the Suharto era, Indonesia 
fought a number of battles with separatist movements in different provinces, of which 
the most significant were those in East Timor, Aceh and Papua. All three conflicts 
have been strongly affected by a change in Indonesia’s policy towards separatist 
movements in the post-1998 era.  
The most radical change can be seen in East Timor, which had been occupied 
by Indonesia since the decolonization of Portugal in 1975. Ever since, the former 
colony demanded full independence, which Suharto had refused to discuss. According 
to Martin and Mayer-Rieckh (2005) the momentous political change setting in after 
the fall of Suharto opened the way for significant progress on the diplomatic front. 
When, after announcing a plan to grant East Timor a wide-ranging autonomy, the 
calls for full independence grew louder, president Habibie unexpectedly declared that 
if East Timor did not accept autonomy, he would agree on full separation of the 
territory from Indonesia. Hence, a referendum was organized (Smith 2005). However, 
when it was announced that 78.5 per cent of Timorese had voted for independence, 
pro-Indonesia militias, supported by the Indonesian army, went on a destructive 
rampage throughout East Timor. Hardly a week after the results were publicized, 
Habibie, under enormous international pressure, requested a United Nations (UN) 
intervention force to put an end to the violence (Martin and Mayer-Rieckh 2005). In 
2002 East Timor became an independent state.      
 The internationally less controversial conflict in Aceh did not experience such 
a dramatic outcome, but here a clear distinction can also be made between Suharto 
and democratic Indonesia. Aceh had been a separate colony under Dutch rule, and 
was granted far-reaching autonomy after Indonesia became an independent state in 
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1949. This autonomy was however revoked under the Suharto regime in 1968, 
causing the birth of a separatist movement know as the Free Aceh Movement 
(Gerakaan Aceh Merdeka; GAM). After Suharto’s fall, GAM gained new momentum 
and forced the new Indonesian authorities into negotiations. These led to a seizure of 
hostilities in 2000. Under President Megawati Sukarnoputri, the hostilities 
temporarily increased in 2003, when she launched a massive government strike on the 
GAM (The Economist, May 21, 2003). This event was followed two years later by an 
agreement between GAM and the Indonesian government about returning autonomy 
to the region (Hillman 2012).    
 The situation in Papua, Indonesia’s most eastern province since 1963 has 
progressed less far, although a similar change in policy is visible. After East Timor’s 
separation, Papuans increasingly demanded a similar route for their province. 
Whereas Habibie refused to negotiate with Papuan leaders, his successor, 
Adurrahman Wahid opted for a policy of accommodation and compromise. Wahid 
offered the Papuans similar autonomy as had been offered to Aceh (Carnegie 2008). 
However, contrary to developments in Aceh, Wahid’s successor Megawati strongly 
complicated the implementation of the 79-article autonomy law (Scott & Tebay 
2005). Hence, the conflict has so far not been brought to a satisfying solution. 
However, it has also not shown any signs of dangerous escalation. This is at the same 
time an important reason for the lack of willingness of the Indonesian authorities to 
follow up on the agreement. As Kennedy (2010) notes: ‘Unlike the GAM group in 
Aceh, which was a direct threat to the Indonesian state, there is no serious Papuan 
group threat to the Indonesian state’. 
 
Political Repression 
Indonesia has also made huge improvements in the area of political freedoms. During 
Suharto’s reign, the government had opted for a systemic disorganization of civil 
society and de-facto prohibition of all membership-based organizations autonomous 
of the government (Carnegie 2008). Besides freedom of organization, press freedom 
was another basic right thoroughly reigned in by the Suharto regime. Before 1999, the 
government and military had exerted all encompassing influence on the media 
through the ownership of newspapers, press permits and strict laws enforced by the 
Ministry of information. During Suharto’s New Order, journalists and editors were 
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not allowed to openly discuss taboo topics such as government performance or 
military violence in Indonesia’s outer regions (Tapsell 2010). 
 The downfall of Suharto’s government has however resulted in a flourishing 
media. The Ministry of Information was disbanded and within the first nine months 
after the power transition 800 new newspapers and magazines were founded 
(Hamayotsu 2013). It should be noted though that, similar to the electoral system, the 
old power structures have not completely evaporated from the media arena either. The 
national broadcasting companies are all owned by former Suharto associates, and 
there has been a gradual increase in newspapers owned by rich politicians and 
influential businessmen. The most obvious example of such practices is the 2008 
purchase of the Subaraya Post by Aburizal Bakrie, chief of Golkar, the former 
political party of Suharto. Bakrie bought the newspaper after it had been critical 
towards the Bakrie family business. Although this purchase has led to renewed self-
censoring by the Post’s journalists on affairs concerning their new owner, it should be 
added that at the time Bakrie purchased the Post, it was an ailing newspaper 
threatened with closure (Tapsell 2010). Other, healthier newspapers continued their 
reporting on Bakrie owned businesses. Hence, although such developments are 
inhibiting press freedom in an indirect way, it can nonetheless be concluded that 
media freedom in Indonesia has significantly improved during the post-Suharto era. 
According to Freedom House: ‘The private print press, while at times shoddy and 
sensationalist, generally reports aggressively on government policies, corruption, 
political protests, civil conflict, and other formerly taboo issues’ (2004). 
   More broadly, Indonesia’s civil society has also strongly developed since 
1998. According to Mietzer (2013) civil society has played a critical role in turning 
the country into a functioning democracy, forcing sometimes reluctant elites to adopt 
new policies that undermine their political and economic interests. Although human 
rights abuses did not disappear, especially in the Aceh and Papua regions, ‘Indonesia 
has many effective, outspoken human rights groups’ (Freedom House 2006). What’s 
more, ‘Indonesian workers can join independent unions, bargain collectively and, 
except for civil servants, stage strikes’ (Ibid.). Hence, although Indonesia’s post-1998 
record on civil liberties is far from perfect, the first decade of democratization 
witnessed a strongly increased ability for protesting and organizing against, as well 
as, openly criticizing the regime. 
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Civil-military relations 
The military has traditionally played a huge role in Indonesia’s political and economic 
affairs. Under Suharto, the military acquired a double function (dwifungsi), which 
allowed it representation in parliament, as well as key positions in the cabinet, the 
civil administration and state owned companies. Moreover, the military under Suharto 
also directly involved itself in all kinds of economic activity (Rabasa & Haseman 
2002). This large military presence in the civil arena did not stop to exist during the 
first decade of democratization. 
 Heiduk (2011) states that clear attempts to reform the societal role of the 
military were made after 1998. He notes that due to the domestic unpopularity of the 
armed forces because of their close affiliation with the Suharto regime, the military 
came under increasing pressure to reform itself and pull itself out of politics. 
Consequently, the dwingfungsi doctrine was abolished and in 2004 the military 
officially withdrew from politics when it lost its 38 seats in parliament. Nonetheless, 
the military largely maintained its influence on society. Despite the promise of 
president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono – Megawati’s successor who came to power in 
2004 – to initiate further reforms of the military, he did not manage to do so. 
According to Beeson, this failure is due to the fact that ‘the military remains an 
organization with unmatched institutional reach and political influence in a country 
where state capacity remains limited (2008, p. 481). 
 Interestingly, however, the large military involvement in civil affairs seems to 
have little consequences for the regime’s internal threat perception and stability. 
Beeson explains: 
 
Paradoxically enough […] one of the unpalatable realities about the 
Indonesian situation is that there is relatively little chance of direct military 
intervention, not because the army has a new respect for the democratic 
political process but because it has no need to. Although an emerging civil 
society may encourage the military to pursue its economic and political 
objectives more discretely, they are still capable of achieving them. Left 
undisturbed to operate their networks of patronage and privilege […] there is 
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little reason to fear the military will seek to overturn the current regime (2008, 
p. 482). 
Thailand 
Compared to Indonesia’s relatively smooth democratic transition, Thailand’s political 
development is much more ambiguous. With 18 military coups in its contemporary 
history, a monarchy that is strongly involved in politics and a polarized elite, 
Thailand’s politics have swung back and forth between democracy and 
authoritarianism. The past decade has proved McCargo right when he observed in 
2002 that ‘the rapid pace of change in Thailand makes taking a long view extremely 
difficult; what appear to be robust processes of political liberalization can rapidly give 
way to crises of democratic confidence’ (p. 112). 
Initially growing out of opposition to military rule generated by the 1991 coup 
and a bloody uprising known as ‘Black May’, the 1997/98 financial crisis was the 
event leading to demands of constitutional reform. The result was the democracy 
enhancing ‘Peoples Constitution’ (Connors 2009). However, the in 2001 firstly 
elected Prime Minister under the new constitution, Thaksin Shinawatra, grew 
increasingly authoritarian during his time in office, resulting in another military coup 
in 2006, after which the People’s Constitution was immediately withdrawn and a new 
government was established, existing largely of military men (Hewison 2007). 
Subsequently, new elections were organized, in which Thaksin supporters managed to 
regain power. In sum, the 1997 constitution caused a democratic reboot, after which 
Thai politics gradually slid back into authoritarianism, resulting in the 2006 military 
coup. 
 
Disenfranchisement 
The drafting of the 1997 constitution on first sight appears to have been a truly 
democratic endeavor. The constitution became known as the People’s Constitutions 
because over two-thirds of the Constitution Drafting Assembly was not drawn from 
the Bangkok elite and there was significant public consultation over the articles of the 
draft document. Nonetheless, according to McCargo, ‘despite these innovations, the 
drafting process remained elite-led, with the result being that the 336-article 
document rejected most of the more progressive and popular proposals’ (2002, p. 9). 
This fact became most evident in the requirement of members of parliaments to hold a 
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university degree, de-facto preventing the mass of mostly only primary educated 
urban workers and peasants from running for parliament (Brown 2007). Despite the 
elite nature of the constitution, its passing could nonetheless be described as a 
cautious victory for liberalism (Connors 2002). 
 Three key constitutional reforms were (1) the creation of a strong Election 
Commission empowered to oversee elections and decide on the organization of reruns 
in flawed contests; (2) a direct election of the Senate; and (3) the establishment of a 
number of other, new, independent bodies, including a Constitutional Court, a 
National Counter Corruption Commission (NCCC), and a National Human Rights 
Commission (Hicken  2006). Especially the Election Commission, independent and 
with far-reaching authority, was a remarkable invention and at first sight a clear 
dedication to democratic values. However, the success of the Election Commission 
has also had a considerable downside. One that contemporary Thailand has still not 
managed to fully cope with. In 2002, Freedom House wrote that ‘Thais can change 
their government through elections that are marred by fraud, irregularities, and some 
political killings’. As a result, the Election Commission suspended a stunning 78 out 
of the original 200 winners of Thailand’s first ever Senate-elections. This did much to 
establish public faith in the Commission. However, McCargo rightly observes that 
‘while widespread cheating surely undermines the legitimacy of elections, so can a 
readiness to set aside their results’  (2002a, p. 119). 
 Under Thaksin, the increase in democratic legitimacy gained through the 
constitutional reforms was slowly but structurally diminished. Having won office 
through a landslide election, Thaksin’s regime started demolishing the newly formed 
democratic institutions. According to Connors, Thaksin’s politicization of the formal 
institutions of the 1997 constitution ‘reintroduced in a new form the shadow of 
authoritarianism that circumscribed the space for liberalism premised on emerging but 
still very much flawed process for the application of impartial rules (2009, p. 365). 
This strategy was most evident through the partisan appointment of the second 
Election Commission, after the mandate of the first credible Commission expired, the 
marginalization of the National Human Rights Commission and the de-facto 
disablement of the NCCC (Hicken 2006). Hence, the replacement of a ‘generally 
well-regarded team of commissioners by this second and far less credible team greatly 
reduced public faith in the Election Commission’ (McCargo 2002a, p. 119). However, 
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it obviously did little to reduce the unwillingness to accept the results of elections, 
whether fair or unfair, and the tendency to challenge these outcomes.  
 Not only was Thaksin’s increasing authoritarian rule reflected in his 
undermining and politicization of constitutional institutions but also in his 
centralization of power. One way in which power was centralized was by forming an 
inner circle of close ministers in the cabinet and by enlarging the political staff of the 
Office of the Prime Minister (Phongpaichit & Baker 2004). According to Lauridsen 
(2009), the centralization of power was not confined to the government and the 
independent watchdog mechanisms. Thaksin also moved to gain control over the 
media, NGOs, local strongmen and civil society more broadly. ‘He looked on the 
country as a company and worked to centralize power in the hands of a single 
authority, namely “CEO Thaksin” himself’ (Lauridsen 2009, p. 425). In sum, 
Thailand saw a strong centralization of power under the Thaksin government. This 
also became evident in the regime’s handling of the conflict with a Muslim-separatist 
movement in the South of Thailand. 
 Thaksin’s approach to the conflict, which escalated in 2004, can be described 
as confrontational and hawkish. Moreover, through replacing those who advocated a 
softer approach with fellow hardliners, he created ‘a culture of sycophancy at the 
highest levels of policy-making’ (Raslan 2004). Whereas perceptions of the true 
nature of the conflict differ widely, the Thaksin regime has depicted the violence as 
actions by a minority of extremists and terrorists (Srisimpob & Panyasak 2006). The 
renewed wave of violence began in January 2004, when a group of insurgents 
attacked an army base, resulting in four deaths. Other attacks followed, but the 
conflict truly escalated when in October a peaceful protest outside the police station in 
Tak Bai ended in the army rounding up a thousand protesters and piling them into 
trucks, after which seventy-eight protesters suffocated on the way to military camps. 
The Tak Bai incident resulted in a large wave of violence throughout the rest of 2004 
and 2005 (International Crisis Group, 2009). As mentioned, Thaksin responded with a 
hard-line approach, including the use of martial law. Moreover, the regime 
systematically undermined a National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) initiated by 
the Privy Council, an organ of royally appointed wise men, through influencing 
public opinion towards the conflict and the NRC itself (Pathmanad 2006). In short, 
Thaksin’s approach to the Southern conflict has been neither constructive nor 
efficient, and reflects the authoritarian nature of his regime. 
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Political Repression 
Whereas the 1997 Constitution had done much to strengthen basic freedoms of 
organization and expression, the space for individuals and groups to publicly voice 
their disagreement with the government strongly declined under Thaksin’s regime. 
This was due to a decrease in press freedom and attempts to undermine civil society 
(Brown 2007).  
  Thailand’s civil society strongly developed throughout the 1980s and 1990s. 
According to the Asian Development Bank (2011), in 1989 Thailand counted 12,000 
local NGOs. Driven by the economic growth of the 1990s, the focus of Thailand’s 
civil society changed from welfare and development to political protests. The 1997 
Constitution can be seen as an expression of the idea that it was permissible for the 
public to openly contest government policies (Asian Development Bank 2011). Well 
developed, Thai civil society remained prominent during Thaksin’s rule, reflected in 
the ability to organize large street protests culminating in the 2006 military coup that 
removed Thaksin from power. Nonetheless, Thaksin’s regime tried hard to reign in 
civil society. When criticized, for instance, Thaksin was ruthless in his counter-
attacks, especially targeting NGOs, journalists and intellectuals (Hewison 2007). 
Moreover, the regime attempted to further limit and undermine labor participation 
through trade unions and other civil society organizations (Brown 2007). 
  The freedom for the Thai press also declined. Thaksin’s attitude towards the 
press became clear early on in his rule. In early 2002 it looked like the regime was on 
the verge of evicting two correspondents of the Hong-Kong based Far Eastern 
Economic Review, because one of their articles had touched upon the sensitive topic 
of Thaksin’s strenuous relations with the monarchy (McCargo 2002b). Although the 
regime stopped short of such a drastic step, it can be seen as a clear indication of 
where things were heading. During the same period, an edition of the Economist 
containing criticism on Thaksin was also banned from circulating (BBC News, 
January 29, 2009). In its 2005 report on press freedom, Freedom House noted that 
‘press freedom declined further in Thailand in 2004 as editors and publishers faced 
increased pressure from the government in the form of civil and criminal defamation 
lawsuits, as well as more subtle forms of editorial interference and economic 
pressure’. Thailand’s press freedom worsened further under the military junta that 
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followed the fall of the Thaksin regime. In 2008, an international NGO monitoring 
press freedom noted that ‘fallout from the September 2006 military coup cast a chill 
over Thailand’s media throughout 2007, as the junta […] used its decretionary powers 
to censor broadcast news, seize control of the country’s only privately run television 
station, and pass new legislation that severely curtailed free expression on the 
Internet’ (Committee to Protect Journalists 2008). 
 
Civil-military relations 
Relations between the military and civilian government in Thailand cannot be 
separated from another prominent actor in Thai politics: the monarchy. Before the 
2001 elections, political power had been in the hands of an elite consisting of a close 
network of bureaucracy, military and monarchy (Phongpaichit & Baker 2005). The 
primary task of the military is the protection of the monarchy, the traditional pinnacle 
of Thai society. As the guardians of the monarchy, the armed forces consider 
themselves to be a genuine political actor (Farrelly 2013).  
 What happened in 2001 was that newly elected Prime Minister Thaksin set out 
to change these old power structures, transferring power from the old elites towards 
his own regime and an upcoming business elite of which Thaksin himself was part. 
Through his increasingly centralized grip on power and authoritarian policies, 
Thaksin alienated large parts of the old elite (Heiduk 2011). Thaksin, however, was 
aware of the fact that few of his predecessors had managed to stay in power without 
the backing of the monarchy and military. Hence, the regime also attempted to gain 
full control of the military and police, by promoting cronies into leadership positions. 
This resulted in a political power play between Thaksin and a retired army general (as 
well as Prime Minister) and close advisor to the monarchy, Prem Tinsulanonda 
(Hewison 2007). The failure of Thaksin to transfer army loyalty away from Prem 
turned out to be an important pre-requisite for the 2006 coup. Nonetheless, the mere 
apprehension of the old elite for the regime is not a fully sufficient explanation for the 
removal of a head of government, who despite his authoritarian way of governing, 
had been democratically elected twice in a row. 
 An additional, more structural factor is the fact that Thailand has not managed 
to consolidate a democratic culture among its elites that would make coups 
inconceivable. Instead, Farelly argues, ‘episodic military interventionism – supported 
by persistent military influence in politics – is now part of a distinctive Thai coup 
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culture that has been reproduced over many decades’ (2013, pp. 281-82). Here, an 
important part of the explanation for the relative tolerance of military interventions is 
the close relationship of the military and the monarchy. As in the 2006 coup, military 
interventions are often justified by claiming the protection of the monarchy, 
supposedly threatened by the governing regime. Hence, Thailand is likely to struggle 
in cultivating a political culture where coups would be unacceptable. Military 
interventions still play a major role in Thai mainstream politics. Therefore, 
‘Thailand’s elite coup culture continues to produce high levels of political 
uncertainty’ (Ibid., p. 292). 
Malaysia 
Similarly to both Indonesia and Thailand, Malaysia was strongly affected by the 
1997/98 financial crisis. In the aftermath the country witnessed the growth of a 
Reformasi movement comparable to the one in Indonesia. The achievements of the 
protest movement, however, differed significantly from its Indonesian counterpart. 
Whereas the Suharto regime was toppled, the Barisn Nasional (National Front, BN), a 
multi-ethnic coalition of parties that had ruled Malaysia since its independence from 
British colonial rule in 1957, managed to stay in power and win the subsequent 
elections in 1999. Moreover, in 2004 the BN went on to win its greatest election 
victory in the coalition’s history. This result was nonetheless reversed in the 2008 
elections, ensuing in the BN’s worst ever result and the loss of a two-third majority in 
parliament. This led observers to speak of a ‘political tsunami’ (Newsweek, March 10, 
2008). The fact that such a statement was made after elections in which the BN 
nonetheless managed to hold on to 140 of the 222 seats (Abbott 2008) says a lot about 
the Malaysian electoral system.  
The nature of this system is well described by Case. Noting that the Malaysian 
system has distinguished itself from other Southeast Asian cases by its persistence, he 
argues that ‘[b]racketed by harder forms of authoritarian rule and liberal democratic 
politics, this regime has mostly avoided steadfast coercion. Indeed, the country’s 
dominant [coalition] has regularly held multi-party elections. And it has refrained 
from grossly rigging or stealing these elections, instead perpetuating its dominance 
through subtler stratagems’ (2009, p. 312). 
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Disenfranchisement 
One cannot understand Malaysia’s electoral system, and the BN’s ability to stay in 
power without large-scale vote rigging, without understanding the country’s strong 
communal nature. Malaysia’s population is made up of three ethnic groups, the 
largest being the Muslim ethnic Malays, whereas the other ones are the Chinese and 
Indians. The BN comprises a coalition of parties, each representing one of the ethnic 
groups. The largest one is the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), which 
is traditionally able to call on large parts of the ethnic Malay electorate. The other two 
main parties in the coalition are the Malaysian Chinese Association and the Malaysian 
Indian Congress. Whereas the BN is officially an alliance, it behaves like a single 
party. Within the coalition each party safeguards the ethnic interest it represents, and 
during elections the parties do not field candidates against each other, and each will 
contest where it is most likely to win (Moten & Mokhtar 2006). This way, the BN has 
managed to occupy the vast middle ground of Malaysian politics, leaving opposition 
parties polarized along the margins, from Islamism to socialism (Weiss 2007). 
 However, the democratic dominance the BN has established over the electoral 
system is kept in check through illiberal means and authoritarian policies. The spark 
that led to the Reformasi movement, for instance, was the dismissal and subsequent 
jailing of former deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim on charges of corruption and 
sodomy. The case was highly flawed and it’s more likely that Anwar was jailed 
because he had increasingly alienated Prime Minster Mahathir Mohamad by 
criticizing the Prime Minister’s policies (The Economist 2004). Besides curtailing 
political opponents, the regime has also strictly controlled the media, politicized the 
judiciary and reigned in the freedom of organization (see below) (Freedom House 
2005). Hence, besides the release of Anwar, the Reformasi movement went on to 
demand systemic reforms in the areas of governance, civil liberties and the communal 
character of politics.  
These demands led to moderate reforms by the government, but, as 
mentioned, the movement failed to achieve far-reaching changes. Moreover, although 
the BN clearly performed less well in the 1999 elections, it succeeded in hanging on 
to its important two-third majority in parliament. The elections nonetheless prompted 
the BN to initiate internal reforms, adopt new policy initiatives and make a switch in 
leadership. This way, the BN and its new leader, Abdullah Badawi, indicated to the 
public that they had received the message and, unlike their Indonesian colleagues, 
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managed this way to keep the Reformasi in check. According to Weiss, such efforts 
‘represent another core strategy by which the governing coalition sustains its 
dominance without recourse to coercion, but the strategy requires that opponents be 
able to express their concerns so the [BN] can redress (and hence, defang them’ 
(2007, p. 33). Thus, by keeping this delicate balance between democratic elections 
and authoritarian rule, the BN succeeded both in preserving full control and creating 
the perception that democratic channels would suffice to instill the demanded change. 
 The success of the BN in the 2004 election was largely due to this strategy, 
which created a public perception that Abdullah would usher in a more liberal 
economic and political climate as well as being committed to tackling corruption 
(Mohamad 2008). The 2004 elections are a clear example of the BN’s ability to fully 
exploit a majorly flawed system without losing its democratic credentials by resorting 
to increased coercion. The 2008 elections, to the contrary, provide an excellent 
example of how the regime is at the same time unable to unconditionally exert full 
control over the electoral system.    
 The main reason for the opposition’s election success was the fact that Anwar, 
who’s conviction of sodomy had been reversed by an appeals court in 2004, managed 
for the first time to unite the opposition parties in a coordinated front, known as the 
Barisan Alternatif. With hindsight, Anwar’s release can be interpreted as a grave 
political misjudgment by Abdullah, who most likely deemed Anwar to be a spent 
force in Malaysian politics (Moten 2009). During the years that preceded the 
elections, Abdullah had not been able to live up to the public expectations he had 
created in the aftermath of the Reformasi protests. Moreover, the BN severely 
underestimated the depth of the discontent that had especially risen amongst the 
Indian and Chinese communities (Ibid.). Hence, incumbency arrogance and Anwar’s 
ability to exploit this arrogance led to the first ever loss of the BN’s two-third 
majority.  
As the above suggests, the concentration of power has been strongly in the 
hands of the BN. Malaysia has a federal system in which the BN dominates on both 
levels (Chin Huat & Chin 2011). The multi-ethnic nature of the alliance, and the fact 
that all factions depend on each other to stay in power means that a strong 
centralization of power, such as happened under Thaksin in Thailand, is not a feasible 
option for the regime in Malaysia. On the other hand, the lack of any separatist 
movements or other insurgent groups combating the state has also made it 
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unnecessary for the BN to embark on a process of decentralization comparable to that 
of Indonesia.  
 
 
Political repression 
An extensive network of civil society organizations emerged from the 1970s onwards. 
These organizations have at times been catalyzed by events, such as the arrest of 
Anwar (Abbott 2008). However, the fact that they have not managed to bring about 
real political liberalization is due to the ability of the government to largely channel 
these demands into the democratic structures they control, while at the same time 
curbing civil liberties. This strategy is reflected in limitations on both the freedom of 
press and the freedom of assembly and association. 
 The latter is limited on the grounds of preserving national security and public 
order. All public assemblies require a permit, and the granting of these permits is 
sometimes politically influenced (Freedom House, 2005). Violations of this law are at 
times strongly repressed by the regime. When, in 2007, the Hindu Rights Action 
Front (HINDRAF) organized mass protests without government approval, the regime 
dispatched around 5000 riot police to disperse the 30,000 protesters. This was 
achieved by the heavy-handed use of tear gas and water canons, and the arresting of 
240 people. Subsequently, five HINDRAF leaders were arrested without charges 
under the International Security Act; a law frequently used for political ends, rather 
than for the containment of threats to national security (Mohamad 2008). Moreover, 
the Societies Act of 1966 makes sure the regime is able to regulate and check the 
various organizations in the country. The law requires that organizations must be 
registered and approved by the government and the regime has refused to register 
organizations, or revoke the registration of existing associations, on political grounds 
(Taya 2010). Nonetheless, the vibrant network of civil society organizations 
demonstrates that the regime has judged it not feasible to act in a manner too 
repressive against human rights advocates and other kinds of organizations. 
 Freedom of speech has been constitutionally curbed by stating that this 
freedom can be limited to ‘protect national security, public order, and friendly 
relations with other countries’ (Taya 2010, p. 492). The primary means through which 
control over the press has been exercised is through government ownership of 
newspapers and press concerns (Case 2009b). Consequentially, this means that news 
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and commentaries unfavorable to the regime have been scarce and that news and 
public affairs programs have been heavily skewed in favor of the government (Taya 
2010). Nonetheless, after the landslide election in 2004, Abdullah allowed a small 
increase in the amount of media space granted to them (Moten 2009). 
 
Civil-military relations 
Compared to Thailand and Indonesia, Malaysia’s armed forces are much more 
constraint and a less powerful influence on society. According to Nathan and 
Govindasamy, ‘[t]he role of the armed forces and police in Malaysian society has 
been sufficiently constitutionalized and politically institutionalized to produce a fair 
measure of stability, predictability, and certainty’ (2001, p. 259).  
Whereas the Malaysian military shows some similarities to the Thai armed 
forces, the effects of these similar factors are profoundly different. Comparable to 
Thailand, the core principle of the Malaysian armed is loyalty to the country as well 
as to the monarch. Contrary to the heavy political involvement of the Thai monarchy, 
this oat of loyalty to the more ceremonial king in Malaysia has resulted in a deep-
seated belief in subordination of the armed forces to the civilian administration. A 
second stabilizing element is the dominance of the ethnic Malay’s within the armed 
forces. As long as the economic and political supremacy of the ethnic Malay majority 
is being preserved, there is little reason for the armed forces to meddle in politics 
(Nathan and Govindasamy 2001). 
In sum, Malaysia’s civil-military relationship is characterized by the 
predominance of the civilian government over the military. Hypothetically, a change 
in power balance between the different ethnic groups that harms the position of the 
ethnic Malays could draw the army into politics. However, the political 
interdependence of the major parties representing all three ethnic groups within the 
BN makes such a development unlikely in the near future. 
Vietnam 
The Socialist Republic of Vietnam is the only of these four states that can be truly 
called authoritarian. That is, the regime lacks any kind of democratic legitimacy, and 
unlike in Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia, the regime has done little to change this 
state of affairs. In power since Vietnam’s independence from France in 1954, and 
gaining control over the state as it currently is after the annexation of South-Vietnam 
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in 1975, the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) has governed continuously through 
a highly repressive system of ‘one-party democracy’ (Gainsborough 2002, p. 697). 
This is not to say however, that Vietnam has not witnessed some profound changes. 
The most profound reform took place in 1986, when the country embarked on a road 
towards economic liberalization. Moi doi, as this program was called, has inevitably 
also influenced the Vietnamese political system. The transition to a ‘socialist-oriented 
market economy has weakened the Party’s grip on society (McCormick 1999). This in 
turn, has put widening pressure on the Party’s claims to legitimacy. Nonetheless, 
Vietnam remains a state lacking any kind of democratic elections, let alone fair and 
free ones. Consequently the vast majority of the population is systematically denied 
any influence on the decision-making process.  
    
Disenfranchisement 
The regime in Vietnam consists of four formal structures: (1) the Vietnam Communist 
Party, (2) the state bureaucracy (central and local government), where the legislative 
branch consists of the unicameral National Assembly, (3) the military, and (4) the 
Vietnam Fatherland Front (an umbrella group of so-called mass organizations closely 
affiliated with the VCP). There exists a high overlap between these various organs, 
with senior party members holding leadership positions in two or more organizations. 
The VCP exerts control over all components comprising the state through party 
committees (Nguyen-Hoang and Schroeder 2010). Representatives on both the local 
and central level of government are selected through frequently held internal 
elections. The nomination system almost always produces candidates that have been 
approved by local party leaders or by the party’s Central Committee (consisting of 
around 150 members) and the Political Bureau (the VCP’s highest organ consisting of 
16 members). Consequentially, the great majority of elected representatives are 
member of the VCP (Kerkvliet 2001). 
 What’s more, the regime attempts to have an all-encompassing grip on 
society. According to Marr (1994), the Party ‘still intends to play an interventionist 
role in society, on all fronts, at every level’ and ‘the idea that the state should limit 
operations to what it can do best, or what others in society refuse to do, is alien not 
only to Vietnamese officials but also to many intellectuals critical of the regime’ (p. 
9). Whereas the moi doi reforms and Vietnam’s growing integration into the global 
economy have gradually made this statement obsolete in the economic realm – where 
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central planning was replaced by greater emphasis on the market to allocate goods 
and services – it still holds for politics (Gainsborough 2002). The reforms that have 
been made were confined to the internal structure of the Vietnamese state, as opposed 
to democratizing reforms aimed at greater societal engagement. 
  One area of reform has focused on enhancing the power of the National 
Assembly. In 1992 it became possible for independent and non-party candidates to 
contest a position through the nomination by a mass organization or self-nomination. 
Although each election has a high turnover of deputies, the number of party members 
in the National Assembly has been constantly around 90 per cent, and the number of 
successfully elected self-nominated candidates never exceeded three deputies out of a 
total of 500 General Assembly members. Moreover, direct Party intervention into the 
business of day-to-day governing has been reduced through a decrease of the 
commissions directly subordinate to the Central Committee (Thayer 2010). 
 Cautious internal decentralization is another way through which the regime 
has attempted to reform itself. This has primarily been done with regard to fiscal 
policy. Through the 2002 Law on the State Budget, a number of fiscal powers were 
relegated to the provincial and local level. Although decentralization of any kind 
quickly becomes noteworthy in a highly centralized system, when put in perspective 
the true significance of the relative budget autonomy gained by the lower levels of 
government becomes doubtful. The sub-national budgeting is seriously complicated 
by two additional requirements. First, the outcomes of the entire process must be 
integrated into a single state budget, over which the central government presides. 
Second, the budgets of lower levels are examined and can be altered by the next 
higher level of government, which then has to send it to the next level, creating a 
‘matruska-doll’ model comparable to the arrangements in Russia (Nguyen-Hoang and 
Schroeder 2010, p. 701).   
 Despite the questionable magnitude of the reforms, their mere initiation begs 
the question of what led to these alterations. Crucially, these reforms are due both to 
societal protests as well as criticisms by senior party officials and heated internal 
party debates. Together with a small number of non-party intellectuals and pro-
democracy democrats, the political legitimacy of Vietnam’s one-party state has been 
continually challenged from within the Party itself. The main message of these critics 
was that the system had been corrupted and had begun to degenerate. They advocated 
thorough reforms of the party apparatus and leadership structure, and gradual political 
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reform leading to increased political pluralism (Thayer 2010). Thus, importantly, the 
image of a homogenous regime that is often painted towards, and sometimes assumed 
by, the outside world, is incorrect.  
 The first significant popular uprising took place in 1997 in Thai Binh 
province, where locals protested against corruption and unfair land rights policy. 
These protests were followed by similar ones in the Central Highlands in 2001 and 
2004 (Luong 2005). According to Wells-Dang, the intent of the reforms was not to 
end the VCP’s monopoly on power, ‘but rather to preserve it, by preventing future 
conflicts such as the 1997 unrest in Thai Binh’ (2010, p. 107). What’s more, whereas 
criticism traditionally came from individuals or small groups isolated from each other, 
regime criticizers have increasingly started to cooperate and coordinate after the turn 
of the century. By 2006, this resulted in the establishment of the influential opposition 
group Bloc 8406 (named after the date of its founding) (Thayer 2009).   
The fact that one of the loudest calls for reforms have resonated from within 
the highest ranks of the party is indicative of the doubtful state in which Vietnam’s 
one-party democracy finds itself. Moreover, the failure of the regime to effectively 
address demands for increased democratic rights and civil liberties, as well as even 
more basic concerns such as severe corruption – in 2006 party Secretary General 
Nong Duc Manh stated that corruption is ‘one of the major dangers that threaten the 
survival of our regime’ (Thayer 2007) – arguably reinforces the regime’s perception 
that its rule is under strain. 
 
Political Repression 
The little space the regime grants its citizens and the media to voice dissent largely 
confirms this conclusion. According to Fforde, ‘[g]overnment pressure against 
dissidents continues, with publicized arrests and prison sentences (2005, p. 151). This 
statement is confirmed by Cain, who states that ‘[d]espite the increasingly 
rambunctious rhetorical battles over the implementation and trends in government 
policy, the Communist Party remains the sole legitimate hand guiding national 
developments, and any voice diverging from this is an outlier in the sphere of 
deviance’ (2014, p. 91). Nonetheless, there is room for some nuance here; primarily 
with regard to the way the regime chooses to respond to those outliers. Moreover, 
whereas press freedom remains restricted and firmly under control of the government, 
the regime has allowed the media more openness on the sub-national level (Ibid.). 
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  The regime is generally unreceptive of civil society organizations. Seeing the 
party affiliated mass organizations as the proper alternative, it strictly controls the 
emergence of such organizations, who’s right to exist acquire approval by state 
authorities (Landau 2008). Despite this law, there is some evidence that the Party 
tolerates NGOs as long as they limit their focus to economic and social issues. For 
instance, Blanc describes the local associations operating in a ‘shadowy realm’ 
between HIV positive persons and the Vietnamese state (2004, p. 163). This relative 
tolerance stops short however, when societal actors turn to political issues. In 2007, 
the government rounded up key figures of Bloc 8406 and imprisoned them without 
much of a trial (Human Rights Watch 2007). The 2001 and 2004 Central Highlands 
protests were met by a de-facto imposition of martial law (Fforde 2005) and in 2007, 
protests of the Catholic Church against confiscated property were dispersed by 
bulldozers and attacks of government sponsored mobs and riot-police (Amnesty 
International 2008).   
 Whereas the regime remains persistently repressive towards external criticism 
and opposition, it has at times taken a different approach in addressing internal 
dissent. According to Thayer, there are gradations in how repression towards internal 
dissent is applied: ‘Party members who make their criticisms of one-party rule public 
are punished more than those who use approved internal channels’ (2010, p. 439).  
 The freedom of the press in Vietnam is strictly controlled. Vietnam has no 
private media and the VCP controls the media through government agencies. The 
Central Committee of the Party supervises all media outlets (Nguyen 2010). Similarly 
to the restrictions imposed on civil society at large, journalists are prohibited to report 
on sensitive political issues or openly criticizing the Party (Freedom House 2009). 
However, the regime has allowed the press to report on low-level corruption. As 
mentioned, corruption is perceived to be a large problem and this way the party wants 
the media to function as a ‘state-sanctioned watchdog’ on the lower levels of the state 
(Cain 2014, p. 86). This has put the press in an awkward position: they are supposed 
to locate corruption inside the same institution that owns them and systematically 
scrutinizes their output (Ibid.). Despite this artificial freedom meant to serve the Party, 
it remains unequivocally clear that the regime does not in any way upholds true 
freedom of speech. 
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Civil-military relations 
In Vietnam, as in other former communist and socialist countries, the Vietnamese 
People’s Army (VPA) has traditionally played a considerable role in state affairs 
(Gainsborough 2002). The VPA has been viewed as the indispensable tool of the 
worker-peasant class to fight imperialist enemies within as well as outside the state. 
Naturally, the legacy of the anti-colonial struggle against France and the subsequent 
war with the United States that ultimately led to the reunification of North and South 
Vietnam has done much to strengthen this perception. Consequently, the VPA is 
integrated permanently into the infrastructure of the state, and its political influence 
has been relatively stable over time. Nonetheless, the collapse of the socialist systems 
in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union during the early 1990s led to increased 
military influence within the regime (Thayer 2012). 
  The power of the VPA was extended in 1992, when the new constitution 
stated that the armed forces were no longer only charged with the defense of the 
fatherland, but also with the ‘defense of the socialist regime’ (Thayer 2012, p. 6). The 
new role was put in practice with the nomination of retired senior military officers as 
state president and CVP secretary general, and increased military representation in the 
Party’s Central Committee at National Party Congresses during the 1990s. Another 
contemporary development was the entrance of the VPA into economic activities. 
Due to a substantial cut in military aid caused by a change in foreign policy and 
ultimately the collapse of the Soviet Union, and enabled by the moi doi reforms, the 
VPA took on the role of entrepreneur (Vasavakul 2001). 
 Military influence declined slightly during the early 2000s, when growing 
internal Party disenchantment over the uninspiring leadership of Secretary General 
Phieu was supplemented with the news that Phieu had ordered military intelligence to 
wire tap a number of his Political Bureau colleagues. Phieu lost his position, but the 
military largely managed to hold on to its power. This was reflected in the fact that 
VPA representation on the Central Committee did not decline, but even slightly rose 
during the 2006 Party Congress. Moreover, despite the size of the scandal, the 
Minister of Defense, presiding over military intelligence, was allowed to keep his 
portfolio and stay a member of the Political Bureau (Thayer 2012). 
 It is highly likely that the strong military presence in the state has contributed 
to the lack of political liberalization, as this would threaten the VPA’s preservation of 
key leadership positions. On the other hand, the strong integration in the state system 
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makes it less likely that the military will pose a direct threat to the regime, as this 
would automatically also pose a threat to their own interests. 
 
Regime Stability and regional policy 
Based on the assessment of internal threat perception and regime stability of 
Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and Vietnam outlined above, what kind of regional 
policy can we expect these ASEAN member states conduct? 
 Clearly, Vietnam has the government with the lowest political legitimacy and 
consequently the regime with the greatest internal threat perception and least stability. 
Despite its relatively late entrance into ASEAN (it officially acceded on 28 July 
1995), the continuous authoritarian nature of the regime should make Vietnam’s 
policies an appropriate reflection of the overall pre-1997/98 “non-intervention and 
unconditional respect for sovereignty” status-quo in ASEAN. With regard to 
Myanmar, it is expected that this translates into an unconditional support for the 
military junta in order to uphold the norms embedded in the ASEAN-Way. Needless 
to say, this will not always be expressed in big words and public statements about the 
great achievements of the military junta and close ties between Myanmar and 
Vietnam. More often this will be reflected in silence, a lack of condemnation, or lack 
of support for proposals to breach the norms of the ASEAN-Way. 
 Indonesia, on the contrary, is the state with the most straightforward 
development towards democracy. Hence, its regime has significantly increased its 
political legitimacy during the post-1998 events, accompanied by a strong decline in 
internal threat perception and a growing regime stability. This development is 
strengthened by the overall improvements in its internal battles with separatist 
movements – although the return of the Aceh conflict in 2003 should not be overseen 
– and the lack of incentives for the armed forces to intervene in politics. It should be 
emphasized however that even though Indonesia’s development has been relatively 
straightforward, it has also been accompanied by large political turmoil in the early 
phase of the transition. With regard to ASEAN and Myanmar, it is expected that this 
translates in Indonesia gradually becoming the strongest proponent of confrontation 
with, and condemnation of, Myanmar’s military junta and consequently of altering the 
status-quo in ASEAN. 
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 Thailand’s development can be said to be the least straightforward. The 1997 
Constitution made Thailand the most democratic state by the end of the 1990s, giving 
its regime strong political legitimacy and a relatively low internal threat perception. 
However, after the turn of the century, the Thaksin regime steadily regressed into 
authoritarianism, decreasing its political legitimacy and contributing to its internal 
threat perception. The destabilization of the regime finally resulted in the 2006 
military coup, removing the last bit of political legitimacy for the new regime. 
Thailand’s Myanmar policy is expected to develop accordingly, altering from 
condemnation and willingness to intervene by the end of the 1990s, to a more 
conciliatory and friendly stance towards Myanmar’s military junta, increasingly 
confirming the values of the ASEAN-Way. 
 Although Malaysia’s regime is hardly more democratic than the regime in 
Thailand, the BN has largely managed to guide societal grievances towards the 
democratic channels they almost fully control. This way, despite the BN’s 
authoritarian tendencies and limitation of civil liberties, their political legitimacy is 
considerably higher than that of Thaksin’s regime. It should be emphasized 
nonetheless, that Malaysia’s development is not completely straightforward either. 
The 1997/98 financial crisis also significantly affected the Malaysian regime, 
resulting in the Reformasi movement, which in its early phase appeared to be a 
serious challenger to the regime. During the subsequent elections in 2003, on the 
other hand, the BN acquired the clearest license to govern in its entire history, 
increasing the regime’s political legitimacy to an all time high. Together with the lack 
of separatists conflicts, and the strong civilian control over the armed forces, the 
Malaysian regime can be characterized as one with a relatively low internal threat 
perception and high regime stability. Hence, with regard to Myanmar, Malaysia’s 
policy is expected to start out supportive of the military junta, coinciding with the 
aftermath of the financial crisis and the Reformasi movement. Afterwards, however, 
the regime’s policy is expected to become increasingly condemning and 
confrontational, reflecting a willingness to alter the status quo in ASEAN. 
	   46	  
 
6. Myanmar and the ASEAN-Way 
This chapter examines the Myanmar policy of the respective states during the decade 
from 1997 until 2007. It does so in order to assess the preferences of these states with 
regard to wider ASEAN reform. Using Myanmar policy as a proxy for wider regional 
policy is fruitful but not always equally straightforward, hence a number of 
reservations and clarifications should be made before this chapter turns to an 
assessment of the Myanmar policies.  
First, unfortunately, foreign policy is hardly ever as straightforward as many 
academics would often like it to be. Analyzing actions is subject to a strong degree of 
interpretation and policy itself can be contradictory. Therefore, this chapter is aimed 
at discerning the broader lines of a state’s policy over the years, without, at the same 
time, becoming too general. What’s more, it is focused on developments within this 
policy. In other words, how (or whether) a state’s policy vis-à-vis its earlier positions 
is in accordance with alterations in the stability of the respective regime. 
Second, it should be emphasized that this thesis does not argue that alteration 
in regime stability is a sufficient variable in explaining the changing and varying 
Myanmar policies of the respective ASEAN states. Ever since Myanmar’s accession 
in 1997, the organization has been severely pressured by the United States and the EU 
to speak out and act against the military junta in order to move the regime to grant 
Myanmar’s society more civil liberties and democratically reform the political 
system. However, this international pressure has been a mere constant throughout the 
period examined in this chapter and thus, on itself equally fails to provide a sufficient 
explanation for altering and varying policies. Even more so because the international 
pressure has always been exerted on to ASEAN as an organization, contrary to the 
individual member states. 
Third, it is important to note that policy of ASEAN states should be measured 
in comparison to each other. ASEAN’s position differs significantly from those of the 
EU and the United States, and the ASEAN member states have been strongly marked 
by a three decades old policy of non-interference, consensus decision-making and an 
almost sacred respect for sovereignty. In other words, expecting the ASEAN states to 
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adopt an equally strong policy towards Myanmar would be both unrealistic and 
analytically useless. 
Contrary to the preceding chapter, this one is not divided in separate parts for 
all different states. As events and actions constantly converge with each other this 
would cause significant overlap. Therefore this chapter is organized chronologically 
around four defining events, their run-ups and aftermaths. These are: (1) Myanmar’s 
accession to the organization in 1997 into ASEAN; (2) the 2003 Depayin massacre; 
(3) the lead-up to Myanmar’s supposed assumption, and subsequent renunciation of 
the 2006 ASEAN Chairmanship; (4) the Saffron Revolution of 2007 and the lead up 
to the ASEAN Charter. 
1997-1999: Myanmar’s accession and “flexible engagement” 
Ever since the possibility of Myanmar’s accession became apparent it has been 
controversial. With the EU and the United States actively pushing for sanctions, 
ASEAN justified Myanmar’s admission into the organization on the ground that 
through its own principle of “constructive engagement” – ‘a subtle, behind closed 
doors prodding towards political reform’ (Kuhonta 2006, p. 347) – it could gently 
push the military junta towards political liberalization. Needless to say, the admission 
of Myanmar was far from being an idealistic matter. More importantly were 
Myanmar’s possession of valuable natural resources and the aim of curbing Chinese 
influence over the military junta (McCarthy 2010). Moreover, this way ASEAN could 
claim to speak on behalf of the complete Southeast Asian region. Nonetheless, the 
trouble that Myanmar would cause its fellow member states was translated into 
practice only a few months after its entrance, when the EU cancelled an ASEAN-EU 
summit in Bangkok on the grounds that EU governments could not accept ‘a high 
profile participation by Myanmar in the Bangkok discussions’ (Associated Press 
International, November 14, 1997). 
 Despite the complications on the international stage, the move was rather 
uncontroversial within ASEAN, with none of the members opposing Myanmar’s 
accession. Importantly, the decision on Myanmar’s accession was made prior to the 
Asian financial crisis and was in accordance with an anti-Western posture that had 
been consistent throughout the preceding decade amongst the member states 
(McCarthy 2010). Besides regular criticism on Western human rights policy this 
attitude was also reflected in the justification the member states gave for their 
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decision. Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mohamad for instance, stated that ‘I certainly 
will make a very strong stand on this. I don’t want people to tell me whom I should 
have as a friend and whom should be my enemy. I develop my own enemy’ (Xinhua 
News Agency, April 24, 1997). In accordance with this, both Thailand’s and 
Vietnam’s Foreign Ministries reiterated the importance of ‘a strong policy of non-
interference in the internal affairs of neighboring countries’ (The Straits Times, April 
28, 1997). In sum, shortly prior to the 1997 political earthquake that was the financial 
crisis, the ASEAN-Way was the unchallenged norm within the organization. 
 As demonstrated in the previous chapter however, the financial crisis caused 
great economic and political turmoil throughout the region, primarily in the more 
open economies of the original ASEAN member states. Generating two Reformasi 
movements, toppling a government that had been in power since the 1960s and 
producing a new democratic constitution in Thailand, this event had a profound affect 
on the stability of the various regimes. These developments are also reflected in the 
debate around Myanmar in the two years that followed the crisis. Here, Thailand 
made the first clear attempt to alter the ASEAN-Way, by advocating a new policy 
framework which it dubbed “flexible engagement” (Kuhonta 2006).  
 The proposal, put forward by Thailand’s Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan 
during an ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in the Philippines was aimed at 
reviewing the non-interference policy in a way that would allow open discussion of 
internal developments that affected other member states (Katanyuu 2006). Partly, the 
proposal originated from the acknowledgement that ASEAN had failed to provide a 
sufficient answer to the region’s contemporary problems, something that had become 
painfully clear by the lack of action the organization had demonstrated during the 
financial crisis (Rüland 2000). According to Pitsuwan, it was time to ‘move ASEAN 
into a higher gear of regionalism’ (IPS, July 24, 1998). However, equally important 
was Myanmar and ASEAN’s lack of ability to reign in its military junta. Pitsuwan 
argued that instead of being the subject of international criticism ASEAN should have 
been on the offensive. Whereas ASEAN should keep its time-tested habits of 
consultation and respect for sovereignty, he added that ‘like it or not, democratization 
and human rights are issues we have to deal with’ (Ibid.). 
 Despite Pitsuwan’s pledge, flexible engagement was strongly opposed by all 
other member states except the Philippines, and after extensive debate, the proposal 
was replaced by the much more meaningless “enhanced interaction”. Indonesian 
	   49	  
Foreign Minister Ali Alatas – who as a part of Suharto’s New Order was still in 
power despite the government’s fall a few months earlier – made clear how far 
ASEAN was willing to go: ‘if the proposition is, within ASEAN, we should be more 
frank in discussing views that may originate in one country but have an impact on the 
other ASEAN countries, then let’s do it … [but] using fancy names like flexible 
engagement and constructive intervention – that we cannot accept’ (Far Eastern 
Economic Review, August 6, 1998). To this, Malaysia’s then Foreign Minister Badawi 
added that ‘to abandon this time tested principle would set us on the path towards 
eventual disintegration […] because criticizing loudly, posturing adversarially (sic) 
and grandstanding bring less results and does more harm than good’ (Business Times, 
July 25, 1998). Importantly, Abdullah made this statement partly in response to Thai 
criticism on the arrest of Anwar, which was the trigger for the establishment of the 
Malaysian Reformasi movement. 
 Although the Thai proposal was shot down by most member states almost 
instantly, it reflects a clear attempt of one of ASEAN’s member states to transform 
the ASEAN-Way. Explanations for the opposition of Malaysia, Indonesia and 
Vietnam are not very difficult to discern either. The regime in Malaysia was at this 
point confronted with the strongest challenge to its rule since the 1970s through the 
upcoming Reformasi movement. Although in the end it managed to channel the 
demands of this movement in a way the regime was able to cope with them, the 
formation of this movement undeniably led to an increased internal threat perception. 
Indonesia was in the midst of a tumultuous transition from an authoritarian regime 
towards one oriented at democracy, where parts of the old New Order regime were 
still in charge. While it is highly unlikely that the position of Vietnam would have 
deviated only slightly, the Party had been confronted with the first serious popular 
opposition to its rule only a year ago in the Thai Binh province. This all happened 
during a period in which the Thai government gained legitimacy through the new 
constitution, the watchdog commissions and the prospect of democratic elections.  
 Hence, two years after Myanmar acceded into the organization, little had 
changed. The Bangkok Post (July 11, 1999) concluded that ASEAN’s constructive 
engagement was everything but a failure: 
The policy of engaging Burma in discussions of democracy, human rights, and 
international responsibility have failed – totally and spectacularly. The only 
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important changes in Burma in the two years as a full ASEAN member have 
been for the worse. Two years ago, Burma’s senior dictator Khin Nyunt had 
opened exploratory talks with the nation’s only independent democratic force, 
The National League for Democracy [NLD] of Aung San Suu Kyi; today, the 
regime will not talk to any democrat . . . Two years ago, Burmese cabinet 
ministers promised to investigate cases of forced labor; last month, the 
dictatorship claimed Burmese love to volunteer their labor for the glory of the 
Tatmadaw, Burma’s army. 
2000-2003: the Depayin Crisis 
Shortly after the turn of the century, the situation in Myanmar deterred, when NLD 
leader Suu Kyi was once again put under house arrest, after she had been released in 
1995 (Human Rights Watch, 2010). In April 2000 Kofi Annan appointed Razali 
Ismael as UN Special Envoy to Myanmar. Razali, a retired diplomat from Malaysia 
with close ties to Prime Minister Mahathir, managed after seven visits to come to an 
agreement with the military junta, leading to Suu Kyi’s release in May 2002. Whereas 
this result was hailed as a triumph of ASEAN’s constructive engagement approach 
(Australian Financial Review, May 6, 2002), the victory was short-lived. Only a year 
later, supporters of the junta attacked Suu Kyi and members and supporters of the 
NLD, killing over seventy people. Suu Kyi was again detained and put under house 
arrest and the NLD was emasculated (International Crisis Group 2004, p. 1). These 
events revealed significant shifts in the Myanmar policies of Thailand and Malaysia. 
Whereas Thaksin’s regime, which came to power in 2001, gradually developed into 
one of the junta’s primary apologist, the BN of Mahathir and Abdullah took on an 
increasingly hard line against the regime in Myanmar.   
Malaysia’s new line was first reflected by Razali’s appointment as UN Special 
Envoy. Razali, a close advisor to Mahathir, subsequently took on an active role in 
encouraging democratization in Myanmar (Katanyuu 2006). Not yet the strong 
condemnations that would follow the Depayin massacre, this initiative nonetheless 
fits the more assertive stance the BN was willing to take when the Reformasi 
movement gradually subsided and it became apparent that the regime had successfully 
weathered the storm. Although the BN’s policy appears ambiguous throughout 2001, 
when Mahathir once more emphasized the strong ties between his country and 
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Myanmar (IPS, January 4, 2001), the 2003 events truly highlighted Malaysia’s new 
approach.  
At first, Suu Kyi’s arrest prompted a response characteristically of the 
ASEAN-Way. After its annual Foreign Minister in June, ASEAN Secretary-General 
Ong Keng Yong told the press that: ‘All of us in ASEAN wish Aung San Suu Kyi 
will be free […] and in our own way, we have explained to the Myanmar foreign 
minister that wish. But we don’t do it in a confrontational manner. We don’t do it in a 
way that makes people feel completely unpleasant about it’ (Associated Press 
International, June 15, 2003). By engaging Myanmar, ASEAN had put the issue in a 
Pandora’s box, currently making it a manageable issue. The question was, according 
to Ong (The Age, June 17, 2003), whether the international community was prepared 
to open the Pandora’s box? 
A month later however, Mahathir seemed willing to. The Malaysian Prime 
Minister voiced the strongest condemnation of the junta’s actions up to that point, 
arguing that ASEAN might be forced to expel Myanmar from the organization if the 
junta continued to defy calls for Suu Kyi’s release and democratic reforms (Agence 
France Presse, July 20, 2003). Moreover, the Prime Minister stated that ‘[w]e have 
already informed them [the military junta] that we are very disappointed with the turn 
of events and we hope that Aung San Suu Kyi will be released as soon as possible’ 
(IPS, July 24, 2003). Whereas part of this strong move might be explained by the 
personal touch the arrest had for Mahathir – as it underlined the fact that Razali’s 
efforts had been largely futile – this was obviously not the first time Myanmar’s 
generals had defied calls of their fellow ASEAN heads of state.      
Meanwhile, Thaksin’s changing policy on Myanmar was remarkable given 
that it represented a complete turn-around with regard to Thailand’s earlier proposal 
of flexible engagement. According to Haacke: ‘Having committed Thailand to non-
interference shortly after his election victory, from February 2001 Thaksin’s 
administration emphasized a policy of forward engagement’ (Haacke 2007, p. 48). In 
the subsequent years, Thaksin’s policy of forward engagement turned out to be an 
enhanced version of constructive engagement, in which Thaksin ‘gradually muzzled 
liberal critics at home, purged the bureaucracy and reorganized the military’ (Jones 
2008, p. 277) in order to cozy up to Myanmar’s military junta and defend their actions 
internationally. Hence, in 2002, ‘Thaksin repeatedly stressed non-interference as part 
of Thailand’s foreign and security policy and insisted that his country must no longer 
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be used for attacks on neighbors (Haacke 2007, p. 49). This last remark should be 
understood in the context of bilateral relations between the countries, as the military 
junta was widely regarded to have close ties with a drug trafficking network operating 
along the Thai-Myanmar border. The battle against this network, known as the United 
Wa States Army (UWSA) led to various border clashes with the Thai military. 
Whereas Thaksin’s early friendly initiatives towards the junta could perhaps be 
interpreted as an attempt to generate good will with regard to Thailand’s battle against 
the UWSA, it is highly unlikely that Thaksin would risk his regional and international 
credibility for an attempt to break the ties between the military junta and the UWSA; 
all the more because these attempts appeared to be everything but futile after two 
years.   
 Following the Depayin massacre, Thaksin could have stuck with the statement 
made by the Secretary-General. He choose however to take a clear soft line on 
Yangon’s actions and sought a public confrontation with Mahathir over Malaysia’s 
clear warning towards Myanmar. During a trade ministerial meeting of the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum organized in Thailand in early June, the 
Thai Prime Minister hoped that business would soon continue as usual: ‘I think the 
whole world is concerned and I think Myanmar’s government understands it. The 
Myanmar government probably will have to do something to bring everything back to 
normal as soon as possible’ (Japan Economic Newswire, June 2, 2003). Moreover, in 
a response to Mahathir’s call for the possible expulsion of Myanmar from ASEAN, 
Thaksin argued that Myanmar’s ruling military should be given more time to seek 
reconciliation, and that they must be given an opportunity to ‘prove themselves’ to the 
international community (Voice of America News, July 21, 2003). 
 This opportunity was soon provided by Thaksin himself, who, together with 
the ruling generals, set out a seven-point road map that was to lead to democracy in 
Myanmar. The Bangkok process, as it was called, was however widely regarded as a 
farce. For one, the final road map failed to mention a possible release of Suu Kyi, nor 
did it offer a clear time frame in which the junta would work towards democratization 
(Katanyuu 2006). By organizing an international summit, which was attended by 
several European and Asian states as well as UN Special Envoy Razali, the Bangkok 
Process did allow the junta to regain some of its international legitimacy after the 
Depayin public relations disaster. According to Chongkittavorn (The Nation, 
December 30, 2003): 
	   53	  
 
The Thaksin administration has done a good job in deceiving the Thai people 
and the international community into thinking that the informal meeting on 
Burma recently was a triumph for democratic reform there. The Bangkok 
process, as it is now called, was the latest attempt by Prime Minister Thaksin 
Shinawatra to legitimize the military junta leaders in Rangoon and annihilate 
the opposition party led by Aung San Suu Kyi. 
 
The approach of Indonesia during the Depayin Massacre can be found in the middle 
of the spectrum, in between Malaysian’s confrontational line and Thailand’s apologist 
approach. During the public disagreement between Mahathir and Thaksin about 
Myanmar’s possible expulsion, Jakarta kept a low profile, abstaining from arguing in 
favor of one side or the other. Strong ambiguity can also be found in the actions that 
the Megawati regime did take. At the eve of the 2003 ASEAN Summit that was to be 
organized in Bali, Jakarta sent a special envoy to Myanmar, in an attempt to convince 
the junta of releasing Suu Kyi. The endeavor was unsuccessful, and it is not very 
difficult to understand why. As her special envoy, Megawati choose Ali Alatas, the 
former Minister of Foreign Affairs that had been one of the strongest opponents of 
Thailand’s flexible engagement proposal in 1998. What’s more, Alatas’ primary 
motivation seemed to be the prevention of further embarrassment at ASEAN’S Bali 
Summit. This was well illustrated by Alatas’ remark that ASEAN wanted to ‘focus on 
the very important issues [on the forthcoming summit’s agenda] rather than focusing 
on the irrelevant issues. Myanmar could understand this condition, and it promised to 
release Aung San Suu Kyi at the right time’ (Jones 2008, p. 280). 
Indonesia’s ambivalence during this period parallels developments that 
influenced the regime’s stability. On the one hand, the 1999 parliamentary elections 
had strongly increased the government’s legitimacy. Moreover, despite the wobbly 
ground it was based on, the fact that the 2001 impeachment of President Wahid by 
this elected parliament had failed to cause renewed political uproar had also 
strengthened President Megawati’s perception of regime stability. On the other hand, 
regime stability was negatively affected by events in Aceh, where a large government 
offensive against the GAM, after the breakdown of peace talks, coincided with the 
Depayin Crisis (The Economist, May 21, 2003). The significance of these events were 
such that the other ASEAN countries – at the same ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in 
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which they issued their declaration on Depayin – felt compelled to issue a joint 
communiqué in which they pledged their support for Jakarta’s efforts to ‘restore 
peace and stability’ and their ‘support to deny the separatist movement access to 
means of violence through, among all, preventing arms smuggling’ (Deutsche Presse-
Agentur, June 17, 2003). 
Not surprisingly, Vietnam was largely absent during the Depayin Crisis and its 
relations with the military junta appears to have been largely unaffected by the 
international turmoil and the intra-ASEAN debate that subsequently took place. In 
March 2003, a visit to Hanoi of Myanmar’s head of state Than Shwe resulted in a 
joint declaration in which ‘[t]he two sides agreed to promote their cooperation in the 
field of security through information exchanges and join efforts to fight and prevent 
terrorist activities against their respective Governments and countries’ (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs Myanmar 2003).  
 
The two sides agreed upon the need to strengthen cooperation on bilateral 
basis as well as in the ASEAN framework with a view to consolidating unity 
and cooperation to cope with current challenges and enhancing the role and 
position of ASEAN in the region and the world. The two sides also agreed to 
further their cooperation at regional and international political and economic 
fora (Ibid.). 
 
Hence, the sole reference that was made to ASEAN was one that confirmed the 
importance of solidarity amongst the various regimes. Admittedly, this declaration 
dates from two months before the Depayin Crisis. However, there is little reason to 
assume that Depayin altered Myanmar-Vietnam relations. High-level officials of both 
countries kept meeting each other on a regular basis throughout 2003, exploring ways 
to enhance bilateral cooperation between the two states (Communist Party of Vietnam 
Online Newspaper, December 25, 2003). 
2004-2005: Myanmar’s ASEAN chairmanship 
At the 2003 Bali Summit, ASEAN had managed to transcend its Myanmar issues by 
announcing a ambitious plan of transforming ASEAN into the ASEAN Community, a 
highly integrated body in the economic, security and socio-cultural area, to be in place 
by 2020 (Dosch 2008). The attention nonetheless returned to ASEAN’s pariah before 
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too long. 2004 was a relatively “quiet” year within the organization, characterized 
primarily by a deteriorating situation in Myanmar, with the final collapse of the 
Bangkok Process and the hardliners within the junta grabbing full control by ousting a 
moderate Prime Minister.  
The next year, on the contrary, witnessed a diplomatic crisis within ASEAN 
that had so far been unmatched. As ASEAN’s chairmanship annually rotated amongst 
the member states in alphabetical order, it would be Myanmar’s turn in 2006. This 
role would have enhanced the junta’s legitimacy by making it a full grown member of 
the organization and allowing it to host a number of high profile meetings, including 
the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), a summit attended by a large number of Western 
states including the US. Without strong improvements in Myanmar’s situation, it was 
likely that these countries would boycott such meetings, damaging ASEAN as a 
whole. Generating a lot of attention on the international stage, the matter promised to 
again greatly embarrass the organization if it failed to find a satisfying solution. This 
time moreover, the issue generated considerable attention within the domestic politics 
of several member states, leading to loud calls for democratization in Myanmar and a 
demand to otherwise forgo the ASEAN chair. This led in November 2004 to the 
formation of the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Caucus on Myanmar (AIPMC). 
According to Jones ‘[t]o illustrate their own frustration with Burma, ASEAN 
governments now gave unprecedented space to their legislators to protest the SPDC’s 
[State Peace and Development Council, the military junta’s highest organ] behavior 
and to generate domestic pressure to which governments could be claiming to respond 
as they moved to deny Burma the ASEAN chair’ (2008, p. 281). 
 During this period Indonesia clearly became more vocal, strengthened by 
successful parliamentarian and, for the first time in its history, presidential elections, 
together with a stabilization of the conflict in Aceh. A clear reflection of this 
development can be seen in June 2004, when Megawati, who would be replaced in 
September by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, clearly spoke out in favor of disregarding 
the ASEAN-Way. Having criticized the junta in May stating that ‘Indonesia is 
concerned that the National Convention [part of the Bangkok Process] and the 
existing process of democratization and national reconciliation in Myanmar is 
considered as falling short of an expectation widely shared by the international 
community’ (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, May 19, 2004), she added a month later with 
regard to ASEAN that ‘[w]e should be able to hold dialogue among ourselves openly 
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and frankly even on internal or domestic issues that, if left unsettled, can have severe 
impact on the region’ (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, June 30, 2004). 
 The criticism intensified during 2005, as the question of Myanmar’s 
chairmanship became increasingly acute. In June Indonesia’s parliament issued a 
resolution urging the government to boycott ASEAN meetings if Myanmar would be 
allowed to take over the chairmanship. The chairman of the parliamentary 
commission, Hakim, stated that ‘[w]e feel that the struggle of the Burmese people to 
improve the democratic process in Burma should be supported by not only people in 
Burma, but also by people in Southeast Asian countries, including Indonesia’ (Voice 
of America, June 1, 2005). It should be emphasized that due to the democratic nature 
of Indonesia’s political system statements coming from parliament cannot be equated 
to those coming from the ruling regime. Therefore, in Indonesia’s case, such 
statements primarily reflect the increasing importance of the problems caused by 
Myanmar’s position in ASEAN. Nonetheless, considering the fact that the 
government issued similar declarations, it is highly unlikely that the Yudhoyono 
administration opposed such expressions of concern over the junta’s policies. On the 
contrary, a few months earlier, Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs had again 
hinted at defying the ASEAN-Way when a spokesman stressed that, despite the fact 
that some developments may be considered internal to a member country, Indonesia 
has ‘also emphasized the need to see things from the perspective of ASEAN as a 
collective family’ (Agence France Presse, March 24, 2005). 
 The BN in Malaysia, strengthened by the largest election victory in its history, 
remained the greatest proponent of interference in Myanmar’s politics. As in 
Indonesia, Members of Parliament (MPs) in Kuala Lumpur also started to become 
increasingly vocal and blunt towards Myanmar’s ruling generals. In June 2004, a 
group of MPs argued that the military regime could cause untold political damage to 
the international reputation of the region and Yangon should ‘respect ASEAN and 
international opinion and return to the mainstream of responsible international norms 
and behavior’ (IPS, June 9, 2004). In comparison to Indonesia, MPs in Malaysia had 
considerably less space in which they could independently operate from the executive 
branch of the government, and the space that was allowed to them was strictly policed 
(Jones 2008, p. 281). Consequently, the fact that the BN allowed MPs to express 
themselves in such clear language reflects its own strong position on the issue.  
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 The regime itself did also not refrain from putting pressure on Myanmar and 
the ASEAN-Way, openly asking for Myanmar’s ASEAN chairmanship to be 
suspended and given to other countries until democratic reforms were carried out 
(AFX International Focus, March 22, 2005). Later that year, Prime Minister Abdullah 
Badawi, Mahathir’s successor, reemphasized Malaysia’s approach, demanding that 
the junta allow an ASEAN delegation into the country in order to assess whether the 
regime had made any progress on human rights and democracy, if it wanted to retain 
the support of the other member states. Abdullah stated that ASEAN was facing a lot 
of pressure and openly wondered how ASEAN could ‘speak on behalf of Myanmar if 
we are not certain of what’s happening there?’ (The Age, December 12, 2005).   
In Thailand, the Thaksin regime, with its ever-increasing authoritarianism and 
confronted with escalation in the Thai South, continued its role as the junta’s 
apologist. Despite the now obvious failure of the Bangkok process, Thaksin upheld 
his public defense of the ruling generals, maintaining that change would come with 
patience and positive engagement. An event that, in this light, requires additional 
explanation is Thaksin’s major election triumph in 2005, as the increased democratic 
legitimacy Thaksin got from landslide victory should have made him more 
confrontational towards Myanmar’s generals. However, as the previous chapter 
argued, the nature of Thai democracy – the relative ease with which democratic 
outcomes could be disregarded and the decisive role of the monarchy and the military 
– made that the internal threat perception of the regime was not substantially reduced 
because of the election victory. Ironically, as it was exactly the still powerful old elite 
that felt increasingly endangered and angered by the ‘arrogant’ regime (Newsweek, 
February 21, 2005), its stability was actually lessened, culminating in the 2006 
military coup.   
Therefore, perhaps, it is of little wonder that Thaksin’s justification of 
Yangon’s actions took on new proportions. The Prime Minister’s defense of the junta 
was no longer only expressed by indicating that Myanmar’s regime was aware of the 
need for democratic change, but Thaksin now openly sided with the junta on the most 
sensitive issue: the detainment of Suu Kyi. After a visit to Yangon in December 2004, 
Thaksin told the Thai people in his weekly radio broadcast that unless stability was 
assured ‘Myanmar will be torn apart into many different countries […] These are the 
reasons they gave [for holding Suu Kyi], which are reasonable enough and 
convincing, because I have witnessed many things in their process’ (Associated Press 
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International, December 11, 2004). The Thaksin government was also clear in its 
response towards the Malaysian proposal for Myanmar waiving its right to the 
chairmanship of the organization. Whereas Indonesia backed Kuala Lumpur, 
‘Thailand will not get involved in Malaysia’s campaign’, stated the new Thai Foreign 
Minister, Kanthati Supamongkhon. He added that ‘[w]e have to be careful; we cannot 
jump to conclusions’ (The Age, March 28, 2005).   
Next to the Thaksin regime, Yangon had other allies within the organization, 
as the regime in Vietnam remained an unequivocal supporter of the junta. Tellingly, 
in April 2005, in the midst of the chairmanship debate, Vietnam, together with Laos 
and Cambodia, was one of the three destinations for Myanmar’s Prime Minister Lt. 
Gen. Soe Win in order to garner diplomatic support for his government assuming the 
ASEAN chair (Myoe 2006). Although there was probably little reason for 
cheerfulness within the organization in the spring of 2005, the two countries 
nonetheless went on to jointly celebrate thirty years of diplomatic relations between 
Vietnam and Myanmar on May 28 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Vietnam 2008). Later 
that year the two states held another meeting in Yangon. According to a Vietnamese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman, the visit helped ‘to strongly speed up the fine 
traditional friendship between Myanmar and Vietnam’ (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 
August 3, 2005).  
Vietnamese support for the junta is reflected most strongly in the complete 
absence of references to the on going situation and Myanmar’s controversial status. 
Whereas the Thaksin regime felt obliged to at times openly refer to the fact that 
Myanmar had problems and should at some point democratize, Hanoi, far from 
democratic itself but at the same time coping with much less international 
controversy, decided to pretend these problems simply did not exist. This way, it 
proved to be the most convenient friend a regime under fire could have: one that 
doesn’t judge you on your deficits.   
 In the end, the chairmanship crisis ended with a whimper. During the ASEAN 
Foreign Ministers’ Retreat in April 2005 in the Philippines, the junta was told that the 
decision of whether or not to assume the chair was in its own hands. However, it was 
also emphasized that in reaching this decision, the junta should act in the interests of 
ASEAN (Haacke 2007). It long remained unclear what decision the junta would take. 
According to a senior ASEAN diplomat it was ‘a matter of trying to find a face-
saving solution’ (AFX, July 25, 2005). Whether this was truly achieved in the end 
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remains doubtful, but the junta clearly bowed to the strong pressure of some of its 
fellow member states. On July 26, at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in 
Vientiane, Laos, a joint communiqué was issued, stating: ‘Myanmar had decided to 
relinquish its turn to be the Chair of ASEAN in 2006 because it would want to focus 
its attention on the ongoing national reconciliation and democratization process’ 
(Joint Communiqué of the 38th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting Vientiane, July 26 2005).  
2006-2007: the Saffron Revolution and the ASEAN Charter 
With the decision of the junta to forgo the ASEAN chair, the other members had once 
again at the last moment prevented major diplomatic embarrassment and loss of 
credibility to the organization and themselves. Obviously though, the larger issue 
remained far from solved. In 2006 it took on greater international proportions when 
Myanmar was for the first time referred to the UN Security Council. Moreover, the 
military junta further widened the intra-ASEAN gap when it refused to allow 
Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar into the country to conduct a fact-
finding mission on the progress of democratization.  
The next year, any progress that might have been made was wiped out by a 
harsh crackdown of the regime on protesting students and Buddhist monks that 
reminded the world of the bloodshed that had taken place in 1988. These protests had 
led to thousands of casualties and the emergence of Suu Kyi as a national opposition 
leader. Although the scale of the 2007 violence was smaller, the Saffron Revolution, 
as the events were called, once more confirmed Myanmar’s status as the region’s 
pariah state and managed to ruin ASEAN’s 40th anniversary. Ironically, it was during 
this celebration, at the ASEAN Summit in Singapore, that the organization, including 
Myanmar, signed its first ever charter incorporating strong references to human rights 
and democratization (Roberts 2010).  
Interestingly, a few months prior to the Singapore Summit, ASEAN as a group 
unexpectedly issued its strongest repudiation of Myanmar’s actions up to that point. 
On the side lines of the UN General Assembly’s opening session, ASEAN chairman 
Singapore issued a statement on behalf of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers in which he 
expressed their ‘revulsion’ at the junta’s killing of protesters, and demanding an end 
to the violence (Emmerson 2008b, p. 72). Needless to say, this exceptionally strong 
language only reflected the preferences of part of the member states. Although it is 
impossible to discern the exact positions of the individual member states during the 
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undoubtedly heated deliberations in New York, the individual responses of both 
Thailand and Vietnam clearly reflected their actual stances.  
 The year 2006 also witnessed a major political event in one of Myanmar’s 
neighboring states. In September the Thaksin regime was removed from power and a 
military junta was installed. The new government, headed by the former general 
Surayud Chulanont, did not alter the line set in by Thaksin during the preceding years. 
Despite the quick announcement of new elections in December 2007, the Thai junta 
lacked any kind of political legitimacy and had opposed a large majority of Thai 
society by removing leader they had personally elected. Obviously, the military coup 
worked strongly to undermine the credibility of Thailand’s democracy, for what was 
even a landslide victory worth if not respected by the losing end of elite and society? 
Hence, it is of little surprise that Thailand under military rule was ‘reluctant to speak 
out’ (The Nation, June 11). 
 Accordingly, when Surayud visited Myanmar in November 2006, he only 
hinted at the countries democracy issues by stating that he had asked Myanmar’s head 
of state, General Than Shwe, to ‘consider’ democratic reform in Myanmar. Surayad’s 
efforts were not only diplomatically very soft, but most likely also halfhearted, as he 
admitted that such demands would be a hard sell coming from another military junta 
(Agence France Presse, November 23, 2006). Nonetheless, the sole mention of 
democracy was more than many had expected. Prior to the Prime Minister’s visit The 
Nation (November 1, 2006) observed that  
 
The new government under Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont has not yet 
done anything to correct the past administration's disastrous policy towards 
Myanmar (Burma). Worse, there have been some recommendations within the 
inner circle recently that the Thai leader should call on the Burmese junta 
leaders in Pyinmana as soon as possible to express solidarity with the 
neighboring country. After all, Burma is a member of ASEAN. 
 
The fact that Surayad choose to address the issue briefly anyway is best explained by 
his wish to avoid too obvious comparisons between his government and Myanmar’s 
ruling generals. Whether the regime had decided that this objective was reached by 
the time of the Saffron Revolution is a question that will remain unanswered, but its 
response to the violence certainly makes one believe so. In contradiction with 
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ASEAN’s earlier expression of ‘revulsion’ regarding the violence, the Thai 
government again emphasized the value of the ASEAN-Way. In a direct reference to 
their own rule, the regime argued that: ‘Other countries thought Thailand’s coup was 
unnecessary, but we know better what was happening here. We should respect the 
right of the government of each country to rule their own nation’ (Agence France 
Presse, October 2, 2007). 
  Predictably, the reaction in Hanoi was even less sharp. Relations with 
Myanmar fared well during 2006, when in August the two countries vowed to further 
increase their cooperation in the economic and security field (VNA News Agency, 
August 3, 2006). Twelve months later, only a few days before protests broke out, 
Vietnamese Prime Minister Dung congratulated the junta on the progress it had made 
towards democracy and hoped ‘the Myanmar people would continue to advance 
steadily on the road to secure peace, national reconciliation, sustainable development, 
stability and prosperity’. Moreover, Dung and Than Shew shared the view that ‘the 
two countries have coordinated closely at multilateral forums, such as ASEAN’ (NVA 
News Agency, August 14, 2007). Tellingly, after the protests escalated in September, 
the Vietnamese media were ordered to report on the events only minimally. 
Vietnam’s most popular newspaper allocated a mere five sentences to the violent 
events, while a second big newspaper only added an additional two sentences to this 
bare minimal (BBC News, September 26, 2007).  
Hanoi also expressed its displeasure about a possible undermining of the 
ASEAN-Way in more direct ways. During a panel discussion at the 2007 World 
Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, Dung mentioned that a number of ASEAN 
member states were uncomfortable with the ability of states to discipline each other 
with regard to domestic issues. Referring to the negotiations about the upcoming 
ASEAN Charter, the Vietnamese Prime Minister argued that ‘ASEAN’s success over 
the past 40 years was based in part to upholding of the principles of non-intervention, 
consensus and mutual respect. The new decision-making mechanism […] should not 
counter the fundamental principles the organization was built on’ (Associated Press 
International, January 26, 2007). In other words, despite the new developments both 
in Myanmar and on the organizational level in ASEAN, Vietnam continued its 
staunch defense of the ASEAN-Way as well as its good relations with the Myanmar’s 
military junta. 
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The Thai and Vietnamese lines stand in stark contrast with those of Malaysia 
and Indonesia. Starting with the former, Kuala Lumpur played a prominent role in 
what was another formal breach of the ASEAN-Way, when it demanded that its 
Foreign Minister, Albar, in function as an ASEAN special envoy would conduct a fact 
finding mission on Myanmar’s domestic developments. The mission was far from 
successful, as, when Albar was finally allowed to enter the country, he did not gain 
permission to meet with either the top of the military junta nor opposition leader Suu 
Kyi. Afterwards, the Malaysian Foreign Minister expressed his feeling that ‘Myanmar 
is dragging us down in terms of our credibility and image’, adding that the 
organization was being ‘held hostage’ by the ruling generals (Associated Press 
International, April 18, 2006).  
Similar strong language was expressed a year later during the UN General 
Assembly meeting in New York. Commenting on ASEAN’s unusual response to the 
junta’s crackdown, Prime Minister Abdullah frankly admitted that ASEAN’s policy 
of constructive engagement had failed: ‘It has been the formula used when we deal 
with Myanmar but up to this stage it has not been successful although it has been 
many years already’ (The Star Online, September 28, 2008). Abdullah added that the 
statement could be seen as the result of frustration with Myanmar that was long 
overdue. The statement was ‘a climax, a result of the sentiments of ASEAN foreign 
ministers’ (Ibid.). 
Indonesia, under President Yudhoyono, continued to be ASEAN’s other 
strong advocate for change on Myanmar and within the broader organization. 
Indonesia clearly wanted its foreign policy to reflected the domestic commitment it 
had made to democracy. Foreign Minister Hasan Wirayuda argued in his annual 
foreign policy speech that ‘[o]ne of the challenges for 2006 – and even the proceeding 
years – is the establishment of rule-of-law based democracy, along with sustainable 
electoral democracy’. With regard to ASEAN, and Myanmar more specifically, he 
warned that ‘it is impossible to forge comprehensive relations if disparities among us 
are quite large’ (The Jakarta Post, January 7, 2006). This was also confirmed by Rizal 
Sukma of the Center for Strategic and International Studies Jakarta, one of the most 
influential voices of Indonesian civil-society. Summarizing Jakarta’s position during 
the critical phase of the negotiations on the ASEAN Charter, he emphasized that ‘the 
inclusion of human rights and democratic principles in the charter is non-negotiable. 
Indonesia must fight for it because we will have no basis for protecting people’s 
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rights if the principles are not included in the charter’ (in Dosch 2008, p. 537). During 
the New York episode, Wirayuda wielded similar language as his Malaysian 
colleague. Asked to comment on the junta’s crackdown, he stated bluntly that he did 
not believe the generals’ take on the events, who argued that the uproar had been 
cause by a strong rise in fuel prices. ‘If the reason given is the fuel oil price hike’, 
Wirayuda commented, ‘I will say I do not believe it. This involves something very 
fundamental, namely a flawed democratization process’ (Antara News Agency, 
October 1, 2007).  
Yet, at the same time Jakarta also pursued a policy that seems puzzling, as it 
appears to stand in stark contrast with the overall strong stance on democracy. At the 
time the situation in Myanmar was referred to the UN Security Council by the end of 
2006, Indonesia happened to be a non-permanent member. Strikingly, Indonesia 
refrained from using its position to put additional pressure on the junta. Indonesia 
abstained from voting for a resolution in response to human rights abuses committed 
by the junta (Haacke 2010). One possible explanation is that, because of the expected 
veto’s issued by China and Russia, Jakarta perceived a positive vote as an 
unnecessary provocation towards Myanmar’s junta. Whatever the considerations, the 
Yudhoyono government was fiercely criticized by members of the AIPMC, who 
feared that ‘Jakarta’s actions would have negative repercussions internationally given 
the impression Indonesia did not support the enforcement of human rights in 
Southeast Asia and betraying its own reform agenda’ (Jakarta Post, January 16, 
2007). Nevertheless, despite this contradictory move, Indonesia during this period 
qualifies as one of the strongest proponents of a though and intervening line with 
regard to the military junta in Myanmar.  
A Cataclysmic Event  
As the above demonstrates, the policies pursued by the respective ASEAN member 
states align closely with alterations in internal threat perception and regime stability; 
providing significant support for the theory put forward in this thesis. One important 
issue, nevertheless, requires additional explanation: the fact that Myanmar was 
allowed into the organization without any notable intra-ASEAN controversy. Not 
only authoritarian Indonesia and Vietnam were in favor, but also, at that point in time, 
more democratic Thailand and Malaysia. This anomaly can best be explained by what 
Krasner (1976) called ‘cataclysmic events’. In his classic study on the role of 
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hegemons in the international trading system, Krasner found that ‘[t]he structure of 
the international trading system does not move in lockstep with changes in the 
distribution of potential power among states. Systems are initiated and ended’, he 
argued, ‘not as state-power theory would predict, by close assessments of the interests 
of the state at every given moment, but by external events – usually cataclysmic ones’ 
(p. 35).   
 This logic equally applies to ASEAN, which witnessed its last cataclysmic 
event with the Asian financial crisis. Despite differences in regime stability and 
internal threat perception prior to the crisis, their was little reason for relatively stable 
states like Malaysia and Thailand to press for organizational reforms or a stronger 
commitment to democracy and human rights: the member states and the organization 
fared well, while the discourse over these issues – opposing Western policies and 
views on democracy and human rights (McCarthy 2010) – differed strongly from 
what it would become post-crisis. It were the enormous political and economic 
consequences of the Asian financial crisis, and the lack of a common ASEAN 
approach to address these problems, that painfully demonstrated the need for change. 
Change however, despite the need for it, is a very sensitive topic in an organization 
like ASEAN, that comprises a high amount of regime instability and moreover lacked 
any serious reforms in its first three decades prior to the financial crisis. 
 In sum, in order for Thailand and (later) Malaysia to start pushing for altering 
ASEAN’s status quo, something first needed to happen that provided them with a 
strong incentive to redirect their policies. This, despite the fact that their domestic 
political situation encouraged them to do so earlier on. The reason that Malaysia only 
became a proponent of change a few years after the crisis was because the regime 
itself was negatively affected by this cataclysmic event – challenged by the Reformasi 
movement. 
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7. Conclusion 
This thesis has set out to examine how internal threat perceptions and regime stability 
affect the ASEAN policies of the organization’s member states, focusing on four of 
them in special: Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and Vietnam. More specifically, it 
asked the following research question: How do changes in regime stability affect 
ASEAN members’ behavior in and towards the organization? In addition, the 
following hypothesis were drawn up: 
H1: The higher a state’s regime stability the more reform minded its ASEAN policies 
are. 
H2: Democratization influences a state’s ASEAN policies through its positive effect 
on the stability of a state’s regime.    
In order to answer the research question and test the hypotheses, the nature of the 
various political systems was analyzed, by examining three factors: (1) the degree of 
political disenfranchisement of a country’s society in general and minority groups and 
special regions in particular; (2) the severity of political repression, i.e. the extent to 
which such basic freedoms as freedom of speech and organization are respected or 
restricted in a state; (3) the nature of the civil-military relationship. Subsequently, 
expectations were outlined about the anticipated behavior of the four states with 
regard to Myanmar, and the ASEAN-Way more generally. In the ensuing chapter 
these expectations were tested, by analyzing the Myanmar policy of the respective 
states during the decade of 1997 until 2007.  
On the basis of the research conducted, it can be concluded that regime 
stability is an important factor in shaping the regional policy of the ASEAN member 
states. The states with the highest regime stability were the greatest advocates of 
altering the status quo within ASEAN. Moreover, the policies of states also changed 
along with alterations in a state’s regime stability. States got more in favor of 
maintaining a strict adherence to the ASEAN-Way when domestic developments 
caused a decline in a regime’s stability. Likewise, enhanced regime stability, for 
instance through increased democratic legitimacy, the conclusion of a domestic 
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violent conflict, or the failure of a protest movement to challenge the regime, 
corresponded with a stronger line on Myanmar’s military junta and louder calls for 
reform of the ASEAN-Way. Hence, hypothesis 1 can be largely confirmed.  It should 
be noted however, that whereas weak regime stability provides a sufficient 
explanation for a state’s willingness to maintain the status quo, large regime stability 
only shapes the preconditions for a more reformist approach. The direct incentives for 
states to take such a line are dependent on other factors, such as the fear to lose 
credibility on the international stage.  
 Hypothesis 2 can only be partially confirmed. Clearly in the case of Indonesia, 
democratization had a profound influence on the stability of the post-Suharto regimes 
and hence their policies. It should be emphasized though, that the role of democracy 
in increasing a regime’s stability very much depends on a domestic perception of 
what democracy contains. Although Thailand was, until 2006, more democratic from 
an institutional perspective than Malaysia – with elections that were more free and 
fair and a more resilient free press – the stability of the Thaksin regime was much 
lower because of the fact that democratic results were easily disregarded by both 
Thailand’s elites and society. Hence, as Indonesia, and to a lesser extent Malaysia 
demonstrate, democratization certainly can have a positive influence on a state’s 
ASEAN policies through its effect on a regime’s stability. However, this conclusion 
should be accompanied by a plainly visible footnote, making it clear that 
democratization in this regard is much less straightforward than it often appears to be. 
With regard to the generalizability of this thesis’ findings, it is self-evident 
that the main analysis is restricted to ASEAN. Similarly to the EU, ASEAN is fairly 
unique as a regional organization. The diversity of its member states remains 
unmatched, and the extent to which a pariah in their midst affected the organization 
and the other member states is exceptional, especially in an organization as 
institutionalized and prominent as ASEAN. Nonetheless, the connection made 
between regime stability and the way it shapes a member state’s ASEAN policy is 
generalizable towards all other ASEAN members, including Myanmar itself. 
Although some regimes, primarily Singapore and Brunei Darussalam, are to a larger 
extent able to legitimatize their rule by providing an exceptionally high living 
standard to their population, even these regimes are in the end confronted with the 
issues of internal threat perception and regime stability. What’s more, the theory 
advanced in this thesis does not solely apply to ASEAN, but has an equally large 
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potential to explain the regional cooperation behavior of authoritarian and hybrid 
regimes in other parts of the world.  
The most obvious limitation of this study is the relatively limited number of 
cases examined. Even though there is no direct reason to assume that the findings of 
this thesis are very case specific, this possibility remains until additional cases, both in 
ASEAN and other organizations, are examined through a similar method. A similar 
observation can be made about the use of Myanmar as a proxy for ASEAN policies at 
large. Despite the many connections made between Myanmar and the ASEAN-Way 
by both analysts and decision-makers alike, it would increase the reliability of the 
argument put forward in this thesis if it was similarly examined through other proxies.   
 A second limitation can be found in the concept of legitimacy applied in this 
study. The scope of this thesis has allowed only for a focus on political factors 
affecting a regime’s stability, leaving out the economic aspect. As briefly mentioned 
above, economical factors do to a certain point grant a regime additional legitimacy. It 
is the author’s believe however, that legitimacy rooted in economic achievements is 
unable to in the long run replace political legitimacy. Hence, it is unlikely that a 
regime’s successful economic record truly reduces a regime’s internal threat 
perception. Nonetheless assessing a number of economical factors would have 
complemented the current analysis on the stability of the various regimes. 
 There are two avenues for potential further research. The first one should aim 
at advancing the theory on regime stability developed in this thesis. As mentioned, the 
theory could be expanded with a concept based on economic legitimacy. Additional 
research could also be put in the way democratization influences a regime’s stability. 
As demonstrated, this issue is less straightforward than it looks. For instance, under 
what conditions exactly does democracy has either a positive or a negative influence 
on the stability of a regime? Moreover, it would be interesting to apply this theory to 
other regional organizations in Asia, but also in the Middle East, Africa and South 
America.  
Secondly, a closer assessment of ASEAN through a regime stability lens 
would be interesting. This would primarily comprise a wider field of analysis, 
assessing additional member states, but equally important, other aspects of ASEAN. 
How do various member states approach the implementation of the ASEAN 
Economic Community, or the numerous ASEAN engagements with the wider region? 
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In short, this thesis has only explored the tip of the iceberg that the research field of 
regional cooperation and regime stability promises to be.  
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